International Relations A Paper

  • Uncategorized

InternationalRelations

APaper

Submittedto (Name of Professor)

InPartial Fulfillment

Ofthe Requirements for the Course

(Nameof Student)

(Date)

Abstract

Thisresearch paper investigates the future of Afghanistan government. Theinternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has recently withdrawnfrom Afghanistan where the full responsibility of national securityis now being transferred to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).Nevertheless, the progress in transition of the securityresponsibility has been minimal. Uncertainty on future of Afghangovernment is hanging like a dark cloud in horizon. The government inAfghanistan is unable to sustain the war fighting efforts and thishas propelled the mistrust between the warring groups.

Thisthesis focused on determining the preparation of the security forcesin suppressing ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents in an effort tomaintain the state security even after the exit of internationalmilitary. The results of the study indicate that Afghanistan iscurrently incapable of fighting the extremist groups. One of themajor factors affecting them is inadequate resources and increasingnumber of jihadist in the region who are fighting to gain control ofthe different territories.

Keywords:ISAF, ANSF, Taliban, Insurgent, ISIS, Al QaedaAfghan Armed Forces (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), AfghanBorder Police (ABP), Afghan Local Police (ALP), the NationalDirectorate of Security (NDS)

Table of Contents

List of Figures vii

List of Tables vii

Introduction 1

1.1. Background to the Research 1

1.2. Research Problem 2

1.3. Aims and Objectives of the Research 3

1.4. Research questions 3

1.5. Scope and Significance of the Research 3

1.6. Structure of the Research 4

1.7. Hypotheses 4

2.0. Literature Review 5

2.1. Introduction 5

2.2. Security Status of Afghan Government 7

2.3. Dedication of local population towards achievement of long-term stability 10

2.4. Critical causes of insecurity within the country and possible methods of suppressing the threats 10

2.4.1. Prolonged Presidential Elections 10

2.4.2. National Unity Government 11

2.4.3. Withdrawal of ISAF 13

2.5. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 16

2.6. Measures used towards addressing insecurity issues 17

2.7. Theoretical Framework/Approach 20

3.0. Methodology 22

3.1. Introduction 22

3.2. Research Philosophy 22

3.3. Research Design 22

3.4. Pragmatic Research Approach 23

3.5. Sampling and Selection 23

3.6. Data Collection 24

3.6.1. Secondary Data collection 24

3.7. Data Analysis 25

3.8. Justification of the Research 25

3.8.1. Reasons for choosing Secondary Research 25

3.9. Validity and Reliability of the Research 25

3.10. Ethical Considerations 26

3.11. Limitations of the Research 26

3.12. Conclusion of Chapter Three 26

4.0. Results and Findings 27

4.1. Introduction 27

4.2. Sources of Secondary Data Analyzed 27

4.3. Themes 27

4.3.1. Community perception on extremism 27

4.3.2. Competency of presidency in fighting insecurity 29

4.3.3. Effects of presidential elections 29

4.3.4. Problems facing ANSF 31

4.3.5. Taliban Insurgence 31

4.3.6. Future of Afghanistan government 32

5.0. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 34

Future of Afghanistan Government 44

International community 44

Recommendation for Afghan Civil Society, Donors and Religious Leaders 45

Recommendation for the Government 46

References 48

Appendix i

List of Figures

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan 1

Figure 2: ISAF Withdrawal from Afghanistan 13

Figure 3: Infographic on number of troops in Afghanistan: source: ARRSE 14

Figure 4: How to solve insecurity problems facing Afghanistan 18

Figure 5: Conceptual Framework 20

Figure 6: Insider threats in Afghanistan 40

Figure 7: Civilian Deaths and injuries in Afghanistan: source UN 2015 42

List of Tables

Table 1: Sources of Secondary Data 27

Table 2: Military and Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan 51

    1. Background to the Research

Afghanistanhas a long history of insecurity. In the 1970s, the United Statesbacked Mujahedeen insurgents to combat the Soviet Army that hasinvaded the country. It accomplished the objective through provisionof military training, financial support and weapon supply. Although,The U.S never engaged in direct confrontation with the Soviet, one ofits greatest economic rivals, it celebrated the USSR withdrawal fromAfghanistan. Unfortunately, the joy was short-lived because theMujahedeen began power-struggle in the 1990s. Soon, the conflictescalated into conflict that threatened the entire Middle-Eastregion.

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan

TheTaliban insurgents, backed by Al-Qaeda managed to establish amilitary regime in the country. While the U.S and the world allowedthe Taliban groups to thrive, they gradually turned into a terroristgroup, with the peak of its extremism leading to 9/11 attacks thatcatapulted the U.S and its Western allies to launch a militaryintervention for curbing Taliban terrorism in 2009. Besides, theTaliban aimed to establish a democratic government that would help tosuppress extremism and continued radicalization. Finally, the westernallies announced that its military expedition in the country was overin 2014. It passed the governorship of the country to the NationalUnity Government. So far, the administration trend indicates that theAfghan National Security Forces including Afghan Armed Forces (ANA),Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), AfghanLocal Police (ALP) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS)cannot provide the necessary security for the population and survivalof the central government.

    1. Research Problem

Thegovernment in Afghanistan faces unique challenges amidst which it issupposed to survive without any assistance from the U.S. troops. Thepopulation in Afghanistan is no longer quiescent and isolated. Everygroup within the population has been politically and militarilymobilized due to penetration of armed militants within their habitatwho compete to radicalize many young men. This has increased therecruitment of the Afghans into national ideological or ethnicpolitics. As such, many coping mechanisms amongst the Afghans isbecoming increasingly less reliable and most of them have beenrelying on the government for their livelihoods and provision ofpublic services. However, the demands placed on government aregreater and task for legitimation more demanding than any other timein history. Currently, Afghanistan’s GDP is approximately $20billion and highly dependent on foreign aid (CIA World Factbook,2015). This is not enough to cover the recurrent nondefense costs andwith the increase in number of defense forces in the country, thenthe probability of finance the defense costs remain a mirage.

Underthese state of transnational and external threats in addition to themounting domestic demands, the stability of Afghanistan require thesecurity forces be equipped with all the necessary capabilities andresources. In light of this, the current research sought tofill the information gap concerning the military power of the AfghanArmy. Some critics claim it cannot withstand the firepower of theinsurgents associated with the terrorist groups. Using pragmaticanalysis of the most recent Afghanistan data, the study sought toestablish whether the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)has adequately trained the Afghani armed forces to combat theextremists (Combined Arms Center, 2011, 141).

    1. Aims and Objectives of the Research

Themain objective of the current research was to investigate thepossibility of the Afghani government in maintaining the statesecurity after the exit of international military from the country.

    1. Research questions

  1. What is the security implication of withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan?

  2. Which security setups such as institutions, agencies and organizations exist in Afghanistan is likely to continue operating even after the exit of ISAF?

  3. What are some of the interests of outside forces in Afghanistan?

  4. Is there a link between security environment and Afghanistan, and how does the external influences affect peace and security?

    1. Scope and Significance of the Research

Afghanistanhas continued to be unsafe and chaotic under the leadership ofpresident Ghani and formation of Unity Government. Therefore, thisresearch will help determine the reasons for the increasedincoherence and insecurity in the country and propose some measuresthat will help mitigate such effects. Fighting with extremist groupssuch as Taliban is not only hindered by increased radicalization ofthe youths but also it is by the fact that some government officialsare feared to overthrow the government based on the fact that theywere initially Taliban militants. The stability of the government anddefense forces is of paramount importance as far as security isconcerned. With the exit of US funding and foreign troops, the futureof Afghanistan government lies at stake. This research thereforereveals the current state in Afghanistan and evaluates thepreparedness of the government in fighting insecurity.

    1. Structure of the Research

Thecurrent paper comprises of five chapters. Chapter one is theintroduction, chapter two presents the review of literature, chapterthree is the methodology, chapter four resents the findings andanalysis, and finally chapter five presents the discussion andconclusion of the research.

    1. Hypotheses

Thisresearch will be based on the following hypotheses.

H1:TheAfghan National Security Forces including Afghan Armed Forces (ANA),Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), AfghanLocal Police (ALP) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS)provide the necessary security for the population and survival of thecentral government.

H0:TheAfghan National Security Forces including Afghan Armed Forces (ANA),Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), AfghanLocal Police (ALP) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) donot provide the necessary security for the population and survival ofthe central government.

CHAPTERTWO

2.0.Literature Review

2.1.Introduction

Accordingto Javaid and Farhat (2013, 312), the departure of the foreign troopswill allow attract the foreign fighters into the country.Subsequently, the transition regime will collapse. The former TalibanArmy will also regroup quickly and establish a strong insurgence thatwills easily allow it to conquer Afghanistan. Finally, the resourcenotes that increased instability will finally lead into a gruelingcivil fight between the government troops and the rebels. Waldman(2013) echoes similar sentiments that the Afghan Security forces lackthe capacity to protect both the citizens and the central government.He admits that the United States’ military intervention in 2001 hasfacilitated development in some key sectors, but the Taliban forcesremain active throughout the country. Nevertheless, the exit offoreign forces can guarantee no long-term stability since thedisbanded fighters will likely come back to reclaim their formerthrone (Waldman 2013, 832-836). Storch (2015) points out theincreased suicide attacks in Afghanistan by bombers affiliated to theIslamic State is a warning the Afghan Armed Forces are even morevulnerable following the withdrawal of foreign forces in the year2014. Furthermore, the majority of the people in the armed forces areformer Taliban officials who have been incorporated in thegovernment. As such, they will most likely change loyalty, andestablish insurgency that will overthrow the unity government. Theresearcher uses critical analysis of the events that followed in 1989withdrawal of the Soviet forces. The unstable political environmentprovided a suitable base for terrorist groups to thrive. Once theforeign forces move out of the nation, similar chaos will follow, andthe insurgents will easily overthrow the present coalition government(Storch 2015). He uses case studies of a previous coalitiongovernment in other states to conclude that such government systemsare rarely successful. On the same note, according to Storch (2015),the country lacks adequate resources to sustain its government. Theeconomy growth is weak, and the natural resources remain extensivelyunexploited. Since it has no potential strategy to pay its armedforces, the armies will most likely disband as soon as foreignassistance ceases. On the long run, different insurgents will come upand begin fighting for the limited resources, and the conflict willescalate into a civil war that the government cannot restrain (Grassi2014).

Felbab-Brown(2015) uses a pragmatic analysis method to review the presentsecurity threats facing Afghanistan such as Al-Qaeda and Talibangroups, as well as its affiliated insurgents such as Hezeb-el-Islami,Haqqani and ISIS, are still vibrant in the region. Therefore, theweak Afghan forces will be overthrown within a short time after theinternational troops withdraw (Felbab-Brown 2015). In a nationalbroadcast interview, Amrullah Saleh asserted that the Afghan armedforces have the capacity to protect its citizens since Pakistan hasenhanced its support for the Taliban. Secondly, the country isalready politically divided after the prolonged standoff thatresulted from the previously contested elections. The National UnityGovernment is extremely volatile, and a little disagreement among theprincipals will lead to exacerbating insurgency fighting.

Practically,extensive research studies indicate that the Afghanistan armed forcesare propped on the foreign firepower. However, this approach isbiased because the NATO troops have gradually trained and transferredthe military responsibility to Afghan armed forces over a longperiod. Khalilzad (2015) asserts that the National Security Forcesincluding Afghan Armed Forces (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP),Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan Local Police (ALP) and theNational Directorate of Security (NDS) have been trained adequatelyto handle the country’s security matters. Therefore, the myth thatthe military lacks the power and intelligence to handle securitymatters without NATO assistance holds no water.

Insummary, if the security forces will fail to deliver its mandate, thedisappointment will result from internal management wranglesassociated with the Government of National Unity. Afghanistan may notbe a wealthy country, and withdraw of the US military, and financialassistance will deny the people some services they are currentlyenjoying. The foreign military process has strategized the withdrawalprocess in a way that that will ensure the local military hasadequate experience to run the country. In fact, the process wasaccomplished within four years, which is enough period to prepare thelocal troops.

2.2.Security Status of Afghan Government

Currently,there is growing concern over the capacity of the army and securityforces in Afghan to fight insecurity. According to NATO reports inNovember 2014, current level of casualties is unsustainable(Giustozzi,18 November 2014, p. 5). There is uncertainty on the ability of thesecurity forces in Afghanistan to hold the government heldterritories as well as retaking the insurgent-controlled areas. Assuch, the security concern for the Afghan population remains a majorconcern (HRW, 2014). While the security forces in Afghanistan havedemonstrated ability to retake and clear the contested areas, theprogress and control remain contingent in delivery of social servicesand governance (UNGA, 9 December 2014, p. 5).

Sincethe end of ISAF’s combat role in Afghanistan, ANSF has beenperforming reasonably well in their encounters with Taliban.Nevertheless, there have been spectacular failures in their defensefor Kunduz where 7,000 security personnel cannot defend the cityagainst Taliban’s assault. This portrays the weakness of ANSF infighting within the urban settings. According to reports by analysts,the failure of ANSF relates to poor leadership and diminishing morale(CACI, 2015).

Corruption

Nepotism,cronyism and corruption are rampant in most government institutions,and unfortunately, the inadequate salaries have been a major driverfor corruption amongst the public employees. Afghans perceive thecivil service and judiciary as the most corrupt with media andreligious bodies as least corrupt (Freedom House, 2014).

Thecapability and size of the governing structure in Afghanistan hasincreased considerably since the fall of Taliban regime in late 2001though the government is still wallowing in corruption, political andethnic tensions(CRS, 2014).

InternationalSecurity Assistance Force (ISAF)

TheUN-mandated ISAF was under the management of NATO since 2003 and itcompleted its expansion of reconstruction and security mission in2006. Despite the addition of troops from U.S. and other countries,the development of the Afghan forces remained under the militarycommanders, warlords, petty bandits and drug traffickers. Meanwhile,resurgent of Taliban increased attacks to the international forcesand Afghan government extending their influence on vast areas,especially the southern parts of Kandahar and Helmand, North and WestAfghanistan (Freedom House, 2013)

Theinsurgent groups did not target the ISAF or the U.S. in theirattacks. Rather, their main objective was to render the Afghangovernment and ANSF powerless. This made them engage in selectivepolitical and military warfare (CSIS, 9&nbspMay 2012). In January2014, the responsibilities of fledging ANSF started to increasefollowing the transition of the security responsibility from ISAF.Withdrawal of foreign troops was referred to as ‘reset andretrograde operations’. The transition period was in five trancheswhere the final tranche occurred in June 2013 (UK Home Office, 2014)after the government signed deals with U.S. and NATO. The agreementallowed the foreign troops to continue staying in the country evenafter the year ends. As part of the agreement regarding thewithdrawal of foreign troops, 12,000 NATO soldiers were to remain inAfghanistan to advise and train the ANSF(BBC News, 2014)

InsurgentsGroups

Theanti-government elements involved all armed groups and individualswho were involved in conflicts against the government andinternational military forces. This included the Taliban and othernon-state armed groups that took part in direct hostilities andassumed variety of labels like Hezb-e-Islami, Haqqani Network,Islamic Jihad Union, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other armedmilitia groups that pursued economic, ideological and politicalobjectives that conflicted with the ruling government (UNAMA, 2015).Taliban remains the core insurgent faction in Afghan. The PakistaniTaliban majorly challenges the Pakistani government and also supportsthe Taliban group in Afghanistan (CRS,15&nbspOctober 2015). On the other hand, the Hizb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin(HIG) has been in conflict with Taliban over the control ofterritories. The HIG group mainly targets the high-profile attacks(CRS, 2015).

Since2001, U.S. officials have all along considered Al Qaeda less hostilein Afghanistan than neighboring nations though they mostly act asfacilitator for the insurgent groups. Nevertheless, according tooutside experts such as WillamMartel,Al-Qaeda is more active than what the assessments indicate. Much isbeing reported on Islamic States in Afghanistan with some surveysciting the government officials as major indicators of the ISpresence (Osman, 2015). The period between November 2014 and November2015 was characterized by a 10.6 percent increase in security-relatedactivities. This was partially attributed to the increasedanti-government activities in mild winter season that favored thecontinuity of conflicts (UNGA, 2015).

Accordingto United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), severalAfghans have been killed in battles in early 2015 leading to an 8percent increase from the previous 2014. Also, the Afghan and U.S.officials recorded an increase in ANSF casualties by 70 percent in2015 (New York Times, 2015).

Thewithdrawal of NATO in December 2014 resulted to a decrease in thenumber of ISAF in Afghan from 130,000 to around 12,000. This impliedthat the Taliban were probably stronger after the exit of NATOforces. This led to an increase in the inter-faction clashes andinsurgents from the Islamic State of Afghan territory as well as theexpansion of Taliban activities to the north of the country (New YorkTimes, 2015).

2.3.Dedication of local population towards achievement of long-termstability

Themain operational efforts of ISAF entailed protection of thepopulation that was most threatened within the Taliban-led insurgencyin Kandahar and Helmand provinces. The working together of ISAF andANSF necessitated numerous counterinsurgency operations inAfghanistan. Media reports indicate that Pakistani Taliban group hasbeen supporting Afghan Taliban. Due to the withdrawal of foreigntroops, the Pakistani personnel have been staging their attacks atthe population in Afghanistan with unprecedented frequency.

2.4.Critical causes of insecurity within the country and possible methodsof suppressing the threats

2.4.1.Prolonged Presidential Elections

Thepresidential elections in April 2014 was characterized by a secondround run-off after the candidates Mr Abdullah (45 percent of totalvotes) and Mr Ghani (31.6 percent of total votes), failed to garnermore than 50 percent of the votes. After the second round, Mr. Ghaniwon with 55 percent but both candidates declared themselvesvictorious. This led to political crisis and was feared to cause thecivil unrests.

Anagreement was made for a Unity Government where Ghani was to serve asthe president and Abdullah as the chief executive. The Elections weresaid to be marred by extreme fraud similar to previous electionssince the ousting of Taliban regime in 2001 (AFP, 26&nbspSeptember2014).One year after the two entered into a power sharing agreement, theprogress has not been recorded. The Taliban has been capitalizing onthe situation in the country by launching numerous attacks in variousprovinces. The ANSF have been dying at an average rate of 100 permonth. This has been termed as the bloodiest fighting since the waron terror began. Nevertheless, it is expected that Abdullah and Ghanidemonstrate the financial capabilities of a country to alleviate thefinancial challenges in Afghanistan.

2.4.2.National Unity Government

Thishas caused the government experience prolonged turbulence..Reports indicate that the government has failed in its delivery andcompetence. The government is facing crisis in management andleadership. The peace talks have not been conducted in the mostappropriate way as the major agenda revolves around the interests ofTaliban. Some people feel that such peace talks appease the Taliban.

Institutionaland personal divisions between the Abdullah and Ghani havecharacterized the national unity government. The varying and multiplebases of authority have attracted new administrative appointmentscompelling the president and executive officer to be involved inconstant negotiation and renegotiation of political pacts that wereagreed upon. It has taken months of delays for the national unitygovernment to agree on appointment of 25 provincial governors and 27cabinet ministers(Sharan &amp Bose, 2015).Such wrangling has massively affected the effectiveness of the unitygovernment. The scheduled 2015 elections were postponed indefinitelywith the terms of current members of parliament being extended untilnew elections are held. This has resulted in many young Afghanslosing confidence with the government and has been massively leavingthe country since 2014. This alongside the exit of the ISAF has ledto Afghan economy stagnating and rate of unemployment increasingsignificantly.

Thenegative effects on the legitimacy of government have been severe.According to recent polls by ATR consulting and TOLO News, majorityof the population is not satisfied at all with the currentgovernment.A detailed analysis of the appointments by the government reflects ashift in power from the former jihadi elites to western educatedtechnocrats. The influential and power figures such as traditionalreligious authorities and liberal reformers have been scraped offfrom political circle. Instead, governors are the ones compelled tocompete with men in charge of sources of finance and security.

Sucha sudden drift in power is considered risky as it undermines thelogic of post-2001 Afghanistan state where the neighbouring statesplayed a major role in controlling the strategic sections of theeconomy and politics in Afghanistan. Before 2014, deputy ministerialand gubernatorial posts were under the extended patronage network ofHamid Karzai. Today, Abdullah and Ghani compete in appointing theirown candidates for the similar positions. Their appointments are saidto undo the bases of political stability and order in Afghanistan.The previous government by Karzai succeed because of the ability tomaintain balance amongst the competing centres of power andethno-regional leaders.

Inan effort to control his power, the president has been relying oninformal patronage. Reports indicate that he has intentionallyside-lined Independent Administrative Reform and Civil ServiceCommission that is responsible for appointing the civil servants. Therecent administrative appointments exacerbates identity-basedgrievances especially the ethnicization of Afghan bureaucracy. Therecent administrative appointments reflect the intensification ofpatronage politics based on ethnicity. This has undermined the moralauthority of the president and set a platform for abuse by hissubordinates.

Patronageand ethnicization provides an opportunity and space forethno-regional leaders to excel. Recently, there have been debates onbiometric identity cards where spoilers are intensifying ethnicrhetoric for personal gains. The leaders in Unity Government mustavoid at all cost any scenario that may mirror the instability inIraq where state underwent fragmentation along ethnic lines. Ethnicdivisions in Afghanistan can strengthen the ISIS and Taliban amongstother extremist groups. Currently, what Afghanistan need is ethnicharmony and unity. The unity government should overcome thedifferences in appointments as well as control the state resources.This will ensure that future appointments are fair and equal.

2.4.3.Withdrawal of ISAF

TheISAF and U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has triggered debates onthe impacts it will have both in Afghanistan and international level.Before the withdrawal of U.S. and peaceful transition of power, Ghanihad risen into power replacing Karzai as the president ofAfghanistan.

Figure 2: ISAF Withdrawal fromAfghanistan

Thewithdrawal of the ISAF is considered a huge security challenge forthe new unit government. As a result, Ghani signed an agreement whereapproximately 12,000 troops, mostly from U.S. were to remain inAfghanistan till the end of 2015 during which they were to train andsupport the forces in Afghanistan as well as joining hands infighting the Taliban. Withdrawal of the ISAF have significant impactson Afghanistan and immediate issue facing Afghanistan security sincethe Taliban are still very powerful and continue to attack the Afghanpolice and western forces despite the joint efforts by Afghansecurity and foreign troops to maintain security in Afghanistan for13 years.

Figure 3: Infographic onnumber of troops in Afghanistan: source: ARRSE

Thoughthe Afghan army and NATO have been training the Afghan police usingtheir own program, the training can be considered to be very far awayfrom being complete. It is alleged that Pakistan if fully supportingTaliban in terms of weaponry, shelter and financial support. Thisrenders the Afghan army is still too weak to counter Taliban.According to some experts, Afghanistan produces 99 percent of theworld’s opium(Cubbage &amp Brooks, 2012).This is equivalent to three quarters of the total Afghan GDP. Thewithdrawal of the US forces is expected to saw a radical increase inproduction, which will mostly benefit Taliban since their main sourceof funding, is drug business.

About90 percent of the budget in Afghanistan’s economy comes fromforeign aid since the country has become dependent on foreign aid.Unfortunately, World Bank expressed its intentions to withdraw itsfunding upon withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan. This implies thatthe economy in Afghanistan will collapse. After the Americanoccupation, many social reforms were introduced which included givingequal rights to women and promotion of education for the Afghanchildren. It is feared that US withdrawal will render the reformsvery weak and giving an upper hand to Taliban. Nevertheless, themajor issue is that the withdrawal of U.S. will encourage thedeterioration of balance of power within the region with somecountrieslike Iraq and Pakistan.

Thegreatest challenge in Afghanistan is Pakistan which has beensupporting Taliban since 1980s and its close relationship with AfghanTaliban. According to experts, the intelligence agencies in Pakistanhave been playing the double games in that U.S. has been funding themto fight terrorism but instead, they support Taliban both financiallyand militarily. The Pakistan protects and nurtures the Taliban hencereactivating the Taliban to destabilize the current government. Thisis an effort to bring into power people who sympathize with Pakistan.

Balochistan,a Pakistan province on the Afghan border, has been supportingAfghanistan but the withdrawal of US forces is feared to havenegative effects on Balochistan. The Balochistan leader, BrahamdaghBugti, has been recorded saying in recent statement that Pakistan hasexpansionist designs where it plays a major role in destroying thepeace in neighboring countries. Bugti also said that Balochistanoccupation and terrorism in Afghanistan are some of the expansionistdesign of Pakistan. The leader also advocated for the limitation ofPakistan to its borders in Punjab. Therefore, Baloch and othersecular nations should be supported in their fight for freedom andprotected from the influence of Pakistan in their expansionistphilosophy of destroying the peace in Afghanistan. Also, Marri, theBaloch Leader, has urged U.S. to review its assistance to Pakistansince Pakistan used the US aid to support terrorism in Afghanistan aswell as oppress the people in Baloch.

2.5.Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

Theinvasion of Afghanistan by Soviet Union can be likened by the currentsituation surrounding Afghanistan. In December 1979, the Soviet Uniontroops invaded Afghanistan. Soviet supported the communistgovernment, which was in conflict with the anti-communist guerrillas,and they remained in Afghanistan until February 1989. Left-wingmilitary officers overthrew the modertate government in Afghanistanin 1978. This led to a power sharing deal between Khalq and Parchamparties. The two parties reunited shortly before the coup. The newlyformed government was less popular and they forged ties with SovietUnion, launched a ruthless purge on all the domestic opposition, andbegan an extensive social and land reforms that were resented deeplyby devout Muslim and anti-Communist population.

Therewere insurgencies that arose to fight against the government amongthe urban and tribal groups popularly known as mujahedeen. Theuprisings and internal fighting prompted Soviets to invadeAfghanistan in 1979 and sent over 30,000 troops to topple theshort-lived presidency under the leadership of Hafizullah Amin. Themain objective of Soviet was to prop up their faltering client stateunder the leadership of Babrak Karmal though Karmal was unable to getsignificant popular support.

TheMujahedeen continued to expand under the support of United States andspread over all sections in the country. Initially, Soviets werecompelled to leave the suppression of rebellion to Afghanistan army.Unfortunately, the army was beset by extensive desertions and wasmostly ineffective throughout the war period.

Thewar settled down quickly into a stalemate since troops from sovietcontrolled larger towns, major garrisons and cities while Mujahedeenmoved freely throughout the countryside. Soviet had tried by allmeans to crush insurgents but guerrillas eluded their attacks. Thiscompelled Soviet to attempt eliminating the civilians’ support toMujahedeen by depopulating and bombing rural areas. This sparkedmassive flight from countryside with over 2.8 million Afghans seekingasylum in Pakistan in 1982 while another 1.5 million fled to Iran.Eventually, Mujahedeen was able to neutralize the air power from theSoviet by using shoulder-fired aircrafts missiles that were suppliedby United States, which was a cold war adversary of Soviet Union(Destradi 2014).

Thereafter,there was political fragmentation of Mujahedeen into independentgroups and their military was uncoordinated throughout the year. Thequality of their combat organization and arms improved graduallythanks to the large quantity of arms and war material shipped byUnited States and other sympathetic Muslims via Pakistan. Inaddition, an indeterminate number of Afghan-Arabs travelled fromdifferent parts of the word to join the opposition. This made the warin Afghanistan to become a quagmire. The Soviet Union starteddisintegrating by late 1980s where the war left over 15,000 Sovietsdead and hundreds injured. Though they failed in implementing asympathetic regime in Afghanistan, Soviet Union signed an agreementwith United States in 1988 where Afghanistan and Pakistan were towithdraw their troops. In 1989, Soviet Union withdrew fromAfghanistan and the country returned to its original non-alignedstatus (Destradi 2014).

2.6.Measures used towards addressing insecurity issues

Thecontribution of ISAF to the development of ANSF leaves behind astrong foundation from which the Afghanistan can start from. Placedin historical context, development of ANSF can be considered aremarkable success story. Currently, there are over 350,000 ANSFforces in control of Afghan security in 34 provincial capitals andmajor cities. The ANSF is in charge of all the security operationswhere they protect the population during public events involvedmasses such as Nazar e-Sherif festival. The Taliban have failed inmaking territorial gains in 2014 despite their direct target to ANSFcheckpoints. This reflects the resolve and competence of the ANSF(Dalenbergand Jansen 2015).

Figure 4: How to solveinsecurity problems facing Afghanistan

Theofficials have underscored the efforts by unity government inacknowledging significant treasure and blood expended to reach thatpoint and commitment by the ANSF to build the legacy. Nevertheless,there is a significant gap remaining within the Afghanistan securityarchitecture that concerns long-term sustainability (Dalenbergand Jansen 2015).

Afghanshave greater and equal responsibility for the problems they arefacing currently. They cannot be excused from assuming fullresponsibility for development of ANSF. The many failures facing ANSFare as a result of critical half decade where the White House cutback the requests from U.S. ambassadors and commanders, andessentially did not have meaningful strategy forthe Afghanistan (Destradi2014).

Thenew strategy by U.S. for transferring security responsibilities toANSF is considered not enough in the fight against terrorism. Thereis high opportunity for the U.S. to lose in Afghanistan unless itformulates effective strategies in correcting these problems and fundefforts towards correcting problems. Such a strategy can be veryeffective in winning Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Afghan peopleshould realize that they cannot be given enough stability andsecurity to allow opportunity for development, successful governanceand an established civil society that meets the expectations andneeds of Afghan people(Destradi 2014, p. 32).

TheNATO/ISAF and U.S. nations should not act immediately in theirefforts to correct the problems and the shortfall in resources duringmentoring, partnering effort and training. At minimum, ISAF/NATO andU.S. should support and resource plans to accelerate the expansion ofcurrent ANSF. Making a fully resourced start is a recipe for ensuringenough ANSF forces.

Funding

Thecountry will require major shifts in partnering and trainingstructure as the ANSF forces shift to areas that are more populated.This helps in moving from combat ethos to effective civil-militaryrelations. The president and his advisors have dismissed theeffectiveness of US in rebuilding Afghanistan. This is only trueespecially since the U.S. did not help Afghanistan in achieving theambitious plans and concepts like Afghan Development Plans. Thecounterinsurgency should involve an armed nation building with ANSFplaying a critical role in maintaining the rule of law to provideenduring stability and security.

Therefore,the ANSF should be funded since it cannot function effectively unlessU.S. and other nations assist in development of capacity at alllevels.

2.7.Theoretical Framework/Approach

Thisstudy aimed at filling in the information gap concerning the militarypower of the Afghan Army. Some critics claim it cannot withstand thefirepower of the insurgents associated with the terrorist groups.Using pragmatic analysis of the most recent Afghanistan data, thestudy will seek to establish whether the International SecurityAssistance Force (ISAF) has adequately trained the Afghan armedforces adequately to combat the extremists (Center for Army, 2014).

Figure 5: Conceptual Framework

Theanalysis of the Afghanistan’s future government will be determinedthrough five key considerations:

  1. Comprehend the country’s security status from a stability-focused viewpoint

  2. The primary dedication of the local population and its goals to achieve long-term stability

  3. Establish the critical causes of insecurity in the country as well as possible methods to suppress the threats

  4. Availability of activities or programs that are focused on addressing the known insecurity causes

  5. Finally, the theory will track and asses the outputs of specific activities and their community influence, including changes that are achievable after acquiring wholesome stability (Combined Arms Center, 2014).

Onceall the entire data necessary to acquire situational awareness isavailable, the researcher will use pragmatic techniques to identifythe major sources of insecurity (SOIs) in the country and thereadiness of the Afghan armed forces possibility of suppressing theproblem. The situational awareness and the possibility to fight backthe SOIs effectively will determine if the Afghan National SecurityForces can protect the both the citizens and the central governmentafter the ISAF withdraws from the nation (Combined ArmsCenter,2014).

ChapterThree

3.0.Methodology

3.1.Introduction

Themethodology section entails the rules and procedures used by theresearcher to base the study and against which various claims ofknowledge can be evaluated. This facilitates review of aspects ofdata collection. This chapter explores the research philosophy,design, approaches, strategy, data collection, sampling methods, dataanalysis, justification for the research methods, reliability andvalidity, ethical consideration and limitation.

3.2.Research Philosophy

Aresearch philosophy is a phenomena based on values, practices,assumptions and concepts. This entails combination of ideas relatedto the function of research and nature of information required, aswell as objectifying the context using subjective processes. Thesubjective reality of the current research was based on historicaland political contexts. In subjective reality, use of interpretiveparadigm is critical in creating a meaning within a given contextwith the intention of identifying the underlying order and patternswithin the political and social world.

Inthe current study, the researcher tried to obtain meaning existing inthe political phenomena through analysis of peer reviewed articles,books, and journals to gain an understanding of objective manner fora subjective meaning in action.

3.3.Research Design

Researchdesign entails the overall strategy used by the researcher tointegrate the different research components in a consistence,coherent and logical manner. This method used pragmatic analysisapproach to determinethe probability of Afghanistan staying politically secure. It isexpected that the approach taken will utilize information from newsitems and scholarly articles to get informative data about the study.

3.4.PragmaticResearch Approach

Thecurrent research adopted a pragmatic approach or mixed method. Apragmatic research approach entails using the method that best suitsthe research problem. Therefore, a pragmatic approach grants theresearcher the freedom to use any technique, procedures or methodsassociated them with the research. This approach acknowledges thecontribution and limitations in different research methods and howthey complement each other. The research was used peer reviewedarticles, books, and journals.

Basedon the nature of the topic and limit factor, use of quantitativeresearch approach through administration of questionnaires orpragmatic research through conducting interviews was quitechallenging. The use of pragmatic research approach was beneficial asit allows the researcher use different techniques concurrently orchoose the one that best suites the research. Therefore, in thecurrent research, data and investigator triangulation were criticalwhere the researcher used variety of data sources and differentresearchers with information on ISAF, ANSF, NATO and Afghanistangovernment (Auerswaldand Saideman 2014).

3.5.Sampling and Selection

Theprinciple behind any sampling technique tends to vary significantlyand may reflect the questions and purposes of the study. In choosingthe study sample, the research used method of purposive sampling.This sampling method is strategic and necessitates the attempt toestablish good correspondence between sampling and research questions(Bryman 2004). The researcher chose to use secondary researchmaterials. In this case, several sources of data related to theresearch topic were collected. Thereafter, those that were publishedearlier than 2011 were discarded. A total of thirty sources wereselected. This included peer reviewed articles, books, and journals.

3.6.Data Collection

Datacollection entails the manner in which data is systematicallycollected during research for analysis. Secondary data collectionmethod was used in the current research. Althoughcase studies were also used, they were restricted to theAfghan-Soviet War that took place in the country between 1979 and1989. The case study was relevant since the conflict back then aimedat establishing a powerful government in Afghanistan that would inturn prevent the country from becoming a haven for extremists (TheEconomist, 2013).

3.6.1.Secondary Data collection

Secondarydata collection is the process where the researcher relies oninformation that has been already gathered and compiled from eitherthe distributor or originator of the primary research. This methodentails collection information from third parties such as researchreports, peer reviewed articles, journals and website amongst others.

Secondarydata is easy to access where the researcher is not required to visitlibraries or administer questionnaires. The researcher is able toobtain a wide range of information from credible sources. This isconvenient and allows for standardization of all the sources used inresearch. Also, secondary data is cheap to acquire hence allowingthe researcher to access valuable information at no or low cost. Thisis much cheaper than when a researcher carries out the researchhim/herself. Secondary data collection facilitates the alignment ofthe research focus. In this case, the researcher can easily realizethat the information being sought for already exists. This eliminatesthe expense and need to carry out a primary research. In most cases,the authors of secondary research give details on how the data wascollected, limitations and procedures. Therefore, a detailed analysisof similar or same research allows the research decide on thepotential importance of information collected and the potentialdifficulties to determine whether the research is worth carrying out.

Therefore,the current research used secondary techniques in data collection.

3.7.Data Analysis

Theinformation from the secondary sources was collected, analyzed andverified. In this case, the analysis involved review of a vast arrayof information. This was mostly guided by the research objectives andresearch questions.

3.8.Justification of the Research

3.8.1.Reasons for choosing Secondary Research

Secondaryresearch was used in the current research due to its flexibilitywhere the researcher is granted an opportunity to use differentsources. Based on the nature of the the current study and sensitivityof the topic, conducting interviews or admnistrering questionnaire torespondents would have been challenging and expensive. Nevertheless,there are other trusted sources like journals and peer reviewedarticles that provided a more accurate, cheaper and easily accessibledata.

3.9.Validity and Reliability of the Research

Eligibledata to be used in the research study was collected frompeer-reviewed research information conducted within the last fouryears in Afghanistan. This implied that the data collected was validand reflected a true picture of the current situation in Afghanistan. In addition, the data was obtained from credible authors anddetailed information on the methods used in information collection. This ensured that the collected data was reliable since the authorshave been directly or indirectly involved in welfare of Afghanistanas far as security and the fight against extremist groups isconcerned.

3.10.Ethical Considerations

Kumar(2005) defines ethics as a discipline that deals with right and wrongbehavior within a moral framework established on obligation and duty.In the current research, the research proposal was submitted andethical approval granted by the supervisor prior to the actualresearch. Bryman (2004) acknowledges that collecting information fromthe other authors without acknowledging them is unethical. In lightof this, the researcher cited all the secondary sources cited usingTurabian citation style.

3.11.Limitations of the Research

Althoughevery effort was observed to avoid unnecessary bias, the resultsmight be biased since some missions conducted by the internationalforces are kept secret. Besides, the extensive damage toinfrastructure in the country prevents adequate media coverage of theinsecurity events taking place in the country. Finally, both theAfghan Army and the ISAF might have withheld crucial data concerningthe damage the insurgents cause to avoid causing security panic tothe civilians (Mazhar, Samee and Naheed 2013, 69). Theinconsistencies in data collection and different literature sourcescould have resulted in inaccurate results concerning the capabilityof the Afghanistan’s Armed Forces to provide security to both theGovernment of National Unity and the civilians (Mazhar, Samee andNaheed 2013, 73).

3.12.Conclusion of Chapter Three

Thischapter discussed methodological approach that was undertaken in theresearch. The research design, methods for data collection, researchapproach, reliability of the research and ethical considerations werehighlighted.

ChapterFour

4.0.Results and Findings

4.1.Introduction

Thischapter draws upon the major themes as well as present findings fromthe subsequent information collected. The key themes emerging fromcollected information were the community perception on extremism, thecompetency of president in fighting insecurity, effects ofpresidential elections, problems facing ANSF, Taliban Insurgence andfuture of Afghanistan government. All the themes appeared to beinterconnected. From analysis of secondary and primary data, it wasclear that Afghanistan is in security crisis without the capacity todefend the civilians from the constantly increasing number ofextremist groups in the country.

4.2.Sources of Secondary Data Analyzed

TheTable below shows the sources of secondary data used. The researcherused 30 sources.

Table1: Sources of Secondary Data

Participant

Profile

Peer reviewed articles

There were articles that were written and reviewed by various individuals involved either directly or indirectly with ISAF, ANSF, NATO or Afghanistan government.

Books

Various books containing the information relating to the research topic. The researcher used books from credible authors who have been involved either directly or indirectly with Afghanistan security hence reliable.

Journals

Journals used contained written record of experiences, thoughts and observations relating to Afghanistan security.

4.3.Themes

4.3.1.Community perception on extremism

Extremismin Afghanistan is running out of hand and is currently in a levelthat is alarming.

Mostof the community members have been expressing their unbelief by therate at which extremism is spreading. Extremists are not in for agood cause especially because they neither have laws nor aconstitution that govern them. This means that whatever they settheir mind to do will always be based on ideologies, which in mostcases conflict with those from the government (Williams 2014)

Hedescribed the current extremist situation as a threat to the nationmainly because the extremists appeared to have better networks andcontacts with most youths.

Mostof Extremists have grassroots contacts and perfect organizationalskills that enable them get more contacts with the youths, especiallythose in marginalized areas, and recruit them at a higher rate thanthe government can prevent (Williams 2014).

Anotherauthor cited the weakness of the government in dealing with theinsurgent groups. He expressed fear in the rising number ofnonviolent groups.

Thegovernment strategy in fighting the violent and nonviolent groupsremains questionable. Though there are considerable steps towardsfighting the violent groups, it is still unclear on what thegovernment is doing to suppress the nonviolent groups which arealways opposed to the government (Storch 2015).

Motwaniand Bose (2015) acknowledge that the insurgent groups pose a majorthreat not only to Afghanistan but also to the rest of the world. Thetwo authors highlight the importance of the foreign aid, not as adictator to Afghan government, but as a savior. They cited instanceswhere the civilians perceived international forces and foreign aid asa manipulative tactic to get to the government.

4.3.2.Competency of presidency in fighting insecurity

Someauthors acknowledge the existence of gap in presidency as regards thewar on terror. They argue that though president Ghani has been makingefforts in fighting insurgent groups, his leadership is faced bynumerous challenges such as inadequate funds and poor domesticgovernance.

Ghanihas tried in reaching out to neighbors such as Pakistan to engagethem in negotiations on how they can help in curbing the currentinsecurity situation in the country. Nevertheless, I feel that such astep is commendable but it will take quite some time before thenegotiations bear fruits (Jedingerand Mader 2015)

Javaidand Farhat (2013) argue thatthe presidency is not actively engaging the international communitytowards the fight against terrorism.

thisgoes back to the incident when ISAF came to assist Afghanistan fightinsecurity and accidently killed some civilians. During thisincident, the president was outraged and perceived ISAF as selfishand inconsiderate. This means that if there were proper communicationbetween the president and ISAF, such petty issues could have beenavoided (Javaidand Farhat 2013).

Itwas clear from the authors that the presidency was not doing enoughin terms of the fight against terrorism. Though many peer reviewedarticles highlight the funding challenges and poor governance, it wasevident that there is still much that need to be done like properorganization and communication with the international community andtheir neighbors.

4.3.3.Effects of presidential elections

Accordingto Jedinger and Mader (2015), thefraudulent and highly contested presidential elections played a majorrole in heightening the current security situation. They argue thatthe government would have been stronger if only one party won fairly.They cite issues like confusion and ethnicity in governmentappointments as major recipe that could have culminated to civil war.

Thepresidential elections were highly fraudulent and the two principalsinvolved were not ready to concede defeat. Even after theintervention of United State and formation of unity government, theirleadership had suffered from poor governance where the appointmentswere characterized by nepotism and ethnicity. Each principal foughtto have his people in government (Jedingerand Mader 2015).

Theynoted that the appointments in government have been characterized byshift in power from the traditional leadership that was therepreviously.

Theformer jihadi elites were replaced by western technocrats. This hasdone away with the traditional religious authorities and liberalreformers. This shift in power reduced the trust of Afghans towardspresidency and governance. Lack of trust to the government provided asafe haven for the Taliban and other nonviolent groups which wereagainst the government (Jedingerand Mader 2015).

Generally,the authors believe that if the reforms will continue being delayedeven after 2015, then the country may not be strong enough to fightagainst insecurity especially because of the poor governmentstructures and challenges in leadership (Dalenbergand Jansen 2015,Destradi 2014, Grassi 2014).

Dalenbergand Jansen(2015)highlight the plight resulting after the two principals failed tohonor the agreement with the United States on the retention of ISAFafter 2014. They had postponed it to 2015 and now that 2015 isending, they have spilled it over to 2016. This has made the US limitthe funding a factor that has negatively affected the government inits fight against insecurity.

4.3.4.Problems facing ANSF

Felbab-Brown(2015) agrees that ANSF is facing many problems like poor planningand logistics as well as inadequate enablers like medical evacuationand deficiencies in reconnaissance and intelligence.

Theforces in Afghanistan are suffering from poor planning especiallybecause the government did not have appropriate structures. As such,some people were trained for weeks after which they were assigned toguard the provinces which were under constant threats from Taliban.Due to lack of experience, many of them suffered serious injurieswhile others were killed (Felbab-Brown2015, p. 410)

Healso highlighted the plight of ANSF due to lack of funding.

Dueto inadequate funding, most operations do not have medical evacuationpersonnel or even means for close air lifting in case of injury. Thishas resulted in many officers suffering from unsustainablecasualties. Also, lack of enough funding has seen many people in ANSFlacking the means to fight and sustain themselves during winter andthis has provided an advantage to Taliban who have been targeting thetroops during winter when most sections are covered by snow and ice(Felbab-Brown2015, p. 412).

Itwas clear from the authors that ANSF is challenged both financiallyand in terms of experience. It is therefore evident at this pointthat ANSF cannot fight Taliban on their own.

4.3.5.Taliban Insurgence

TheTaliban militia have been trying so much to overrun some of theprovinces in Afghanistan. Their main intention is to destabilize thegovernment and gain control over the country.

Accordingto Laub (2014), the move to overrun some provinces have negativeimplications on Afghan forces since they have to call forreinforcement. This implies that some areas have to be eitherdeprived of forces or given the newly trained forces to be in charge.Such militia do not have the capacity to resist Taliban insurgence.

Also,Lee (2015) argues that insecurity is also caused by some political,business and ethnic groups with varying ideologies. Taliban takesadvantage of the fractious and discriminatory situation to recruityouths from these warring areas as well as carry out insurgents.

Talibanhas always taken advantage of any gap in security situation in theprovinces to carry out insurgents as well as recruit youths fromthese areas (Lee 2015, p. 37).

Lynch(2015) says that many insurgent groups are not mostly concerned withthe ISAF and other international communities. He points out that themain objective of these groups is to render the government inAfghanistan and ANSF powerless.

4.3.6.Future of Afghanistan government

Asnoted by most authors, the future of Afghanistan government isdependent on International community, religious leaders and civilsocieties and the government itself. Masoud (2015) argue that theinternational community will be critical in the fight againstinsecurity. Nevertheless, the international community should enjoysome protection from the government to ensure that their activitiesare protected and they are not considered to manipulate thegovernment as it was previously.

Shahrani(2015) describes the need for civil societies, donors and religiousleaders to work with the government in creating awareness amongst thepopulation on the need to protect their country and not to engage inany activities that will destabilize the country. He argues thatthose groups are well versed with the community needs and can easilyinteract with the people and sensitize them. Therefore, there is needfor the government to protect the population before they getrecruited by the insurgent groups.

Mazhar,Samee and Naheed (2015)recommend the need for Afghan government to realize that theextremist groups pose a major threat to the stability of the countryand should come up with the strategy that will help counter suchgroups both in short term and long term.

ChapterFive

5.0.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Fromthe finding of the research, it is clear that as the U.S. has triedwinding down the military participation in their counterinsurgency inAfghanistan after struggling with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda for over adecade, the future of Afghanistan remains precarious at best. Talibanand affiliated insurgent groups like Hezb-e-Islami and HaqqaniNetwork are still deeply entrenched. Nevertheless, it is clear fromthe analysis of the articles that the new international jihadiaffiliates like ISIS have been trying to establish themselves inAfghanistan. This has caused an atmosphere of uncertainty fromdifferent authors regarding the ongoing dilemma in political,economic and security transitions that have pervaded the countrysince 2013 (Destradi2014).

Asnoted by Jedinger and Mader (2015), the formation of Unity Governmentin 2014 after the highly contested elections appeared to be aculmination of uncertainty in the region. The newly formed governmentfaced fundamental structural problems which were clearly visibleafter eight months in office. The deep and broad political problemsexacerbated during elections had not started to heal. Looming onhorizon was the political crisis that was generated by parliamentaryelections especially the LoyaJirga&nbspthatwanted to reform the constitution by 2016 to alter the basisarrangement of power and codify the structure of unity government(Fazli, Johnson and Cooke 2015).

Thearticles analysed to determine the main drivers of radicalization andextremist activities revealed that extremism is currently goingoutside the Sharia laws. Extremists are considered as rebellious andrejecting the political order of 2001(Grassi 2014). The authorsbelieved that extremism was a major problem to the security of thenation. Nevertheless, some authors like Lynch (2015) argued thatthere were civilians who believed that extremists were justified intheir cause. He says that only 10 percent of the 60 percent whoclaim to be against extremism are ready to fight for Afghanistan.This implied that the will to act aggressively is lacking. Therepresentatives of nongovernmental organisation and civil societyactivists have been out-manoeuvred by nonviolent Islamist groups,violent extremist groups and mullahs whose organizational skills andgrassroots contacts were better particularly amongst the youths(Fazli, Johnson and Cooke 2015).

Lyall,Blair and Imai (2014) consider a move to publicly question violentextremism as very risky especially in volatile areas such asNangarhar and Herat provinces. The inability to mobilize theconstituencies effectively is attributed to lack of indigenous andclear anti-extremist narrative. The increased corruption and poorgovernance in the country hinder any advancement towardspro-democracy narrative. Also, the invoking anti-extremist rhetorictargeted to groups like Taliban without it been mistaken asanti-Afghan or anti-Islamic inhibits efforts towards fighting theextremist groups (Felbab-Brown 2015).

Laub(2014) and Motwaniand Bose (2015) believe that the Afghanistan government has not beeneffective in their CVE efforts and many people have been questioningthe appropriateness of the strategy used by the government in dealingwith both the violent Taliban group and nonviolent and outspokenlyanti-government groups like Jamiat-e Islah and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Thesegroups have a huge youth base and have been openly criticizing thegovernment though they have been nonviolent in their actions (Fazli,Johnson and Cooke 2015).

Accordingto the survey carried out by Smith (2014) on ‘prospects forAfghanistan as ISAF withdrawal approaches’, most civilians wereunsure whether the non-violent groups may consequently becomeviolent. The groups have been facing numerous problems both from thegovernment and from violent groups such as Taliban. Given thehistorical records of violent political oppositions, Felbab-Brown(2015) considers nonviolent groups to be among the first to makeviolent push as well as expel the government while other believedthat fear of anarchy in case the state collapses and rise of someextremist groups like ISIS would compel the nonviolent groups tofiercely oppose the government. Either way, main concern for most ofauthors was the lack of transparency and confusion that existed aboutthe nonviolent groups, their goals, support networks and motives(Felbab-Brown 2015, p. 101).

Despitethe occasional predatory behaviour and continued weakness of thegovernment, the perception of the many civilians on violent extremistgroups was overwhelmingly negative (Waldman 2015). In his interviewwith Lt. General David Deptula USAF (Ret.), Williams (2015) says thatextremists are cannot justify their insurgent activities. Anotherissue that are evident from the review of journals is that thegovernment is having weak voice and hence constantly exposingAfghanistan under the influence of foreigners. It was noted that manyextremists used religion to advance their self-interests. Lang (2015)argues that based on the fact that Taliban do not have a constitutionor government then this implies that their punishments andinsurgencies are majorly based on subjective tastes instead ofreligion law or constitutional laws. Also, the nonviolent groups likeHizb ut-Tahrir and Mullah were questioned by many authors as theiragendas and funding seemed to have been sourced externally (Grassi2014, Khalilzad 2013, Lee 2015). This had little to do with Islamiccredentials of the groups or actors but was based mostly on perceiveddeficit in being an Afghan. Indeed, both the forces opposing thegovernment and government itself were perceived by many authors aslegitimate if they approved how they can make Afghan be a betterplace (Fazli, Johnson and Cooke 2015).

Meanwhile,after the exit of ISAF, the fighting season between Afghan securityand Taliban has been at its bloodiest since 2001. There have beensignificant instances of insecurity in the country with civiliandeaths shooting up while the security forces are taking fatal andpotentially unsustainable casualties. It is clear that the forces inAfghanistan have numerous deficiencies. Nevertheless, as noted fromthe Gross (2014), the Taliban has also been suffering from manychallenges on its capacity to hold as many territories in Afghanistanas possible in future.

PresidentGhani competence in fighting against terrorism is highly faced bynumerous challenges such as structural dependence on internationalfunding and domestic governance mire staking his presidency onnegotiations with Taliban. To facilitate negotiations, Ghani reachedout to Pakistan in a politically and daring costly gambit. Thoughsome initial initiatives towards commencing the negotiations areunderway, there has been limited pay off and Ghani’s politicalspace continues to shrink. Also, any fruitful negotiations may bereal after several years to come (Javaid and Farhat 2013).

Until2014 summer, the support of Afghan government from U.S. has beenunderspecified and limited. The Obama’s admin had inherited warfrom Bush Administration at a time when the security in Afghanistanwas not good at all. The Haqqani and Taliban influences had increasedand the governance in Afghan was deteriorating progressively. Afghanwas undergoing one of the toughest security challenges since 2001alongside rampant corruption. During the presidential campaigns in2008, Obama had emphasized that the critical but unfinished ‘war ofnecessity’ (Javaid and Farhat 2013).

Despitethe rhetoric involved in elections, the Obama’s administrationafter taking over power had been suffering from similar dilemmaexperienced by Bush administration in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda was themajor terrorism targets to United States and the administrationargued that what happening on ground mattered only to a limited scaleand that they needed to combat counterterrorism operations onAl-Qaeda and its allies from air so as to reduce the presence oftheir troops in Afghanistan (Jedinger and Mader 2015).

However,the president of Afghanistan was outraged by the accident killing ofinnocent civilians by ISAF. This made the president and populationdoubt that the presence of ISAF in Afghanistan would be instrumentalin stabilizing the country. Most of Afghans believed that theinterest of US government was to prosecute the new great game againstChina and Russia. As a result, the US opted to withdraw fromAfghanistan by the end of 2016. Other Jihadist groups such as ISIStook advantage of the US withdrawal plans and extensively spreadacross Pakistan and Middle East which compelled US to bomb the ISIStargets in Iraq as well as mobilize international coalition againstre-invigorated insurgency (Khalilzad 2014).

Manybooks and peer reviewed journals indicate that the highly fraudulentand contested presidential elections played a major role in ignitingprolonged and intense political crisis. The crisis brought thecountry to the peak of ethnic and political violence and was in theverge of provoking a military coup that would have eventuallyculminated to civil war. US had during this time ordered an overdrivewith the aim of averting such disastrous outcomes. The recount ofvotes confirmed extensive fraud by principal contenders and neitherwas ready to accept defeat. This compelled the US embassy come in andproposed formation of unity government covering bare minimum deal andsketching out mere outlines and details. The structuralconstitutional and electoral reforms were to be worked out later.This is still unresolved up to today (Khalilzad 2014).

Thetwo principals, Ghani and Abdullah signed the agreement by UnitedStates on how to keep the ISAF in Afghanistan after 2014.Nevertheless, the NUG never met the agreement by 2014 and this wasspilled over to 2016 though NATO and US have been providing limitedtraining and advice support to the Afghan forces. This has compelledthe forces in Afghan to continue standing on their own but theresponsibility has been assigned to ANSF. The ISAF handed over toANSF a stalemated war where they had already cleared and reduced theterritory for insurgent forces. In spring of 2014, there was a majorachievement in Afghanistan when ANSF managed to prevent a majormilitary disruption from the Taliban (Lang 2015).

Bythe summer of 2014, the ANSF was facing numerous problems includingpoor planning and logistics, inadequate specialty enablers likemedical evacuation and deficiencies in reconnaissance andintelligence. This inhibited the full manifestation of sustainmentfunctions making them remain unaddressed. ANSF suffered fromunsustainable and extensive casualties. For instance, in 2014 alone,over 20,000 ANSF support personnel and soldiers lost their lives dueto injuries and deaths in desertions, discharges and combat(Khalilzad 2014).

Financialconstraints also present another major problem. In this case, ANSFfully depended on funding from US and other foreign funding. The factthat the forces failed to engage in a coup after the fraudulentpresidential elections was commendable. The ANSF refused to befractures along ethnic lines though ethnic and patronagefactionalisation and fragmentation remain a real possibility amongstthem which is feared to be disastrous if it erupts (Smith 2014).

Bythe end of 2014, almost all areas in Afghanistan were covered by iceand snow. During this period, Taliban heightened their attacks andtheir campaigns were aggressive during this period. The onset of 2015was characterised by difficulties in fighting the Taliban as the armywas compelled to endure the significantly worsening securitysituation in the country (Shahrani 2015). The army is currentlysuffering from deficiencies and problems in funds to finance theirlogistics, special support functions like medical evacuation andintelligence resource. Lack of close-air support in Afghanistan posesa major threat and can greatly boost insurgency (Masoud 2015).

Figure 6: Insider threats inAfghanistan

Assuch, it is agreeable that the ANSF cannot fight Taliban without anyassistance. Therefore, US government agreed in March 2015 not toreduce their military presence in Afghanistan throughout 2015. Thisimplied that ten thousand US personnel will remain in Afghanistan. ByJune 2015, reports indicated that US forces in Afghanistan wereengaging in direct offensive operations against both the Al Qaeda andTaliban (Laub 2014). This implied that they went beyond advisory andtraining and beyond the force protection. They provided air supportincluding drones, which was critically needed by Afghan army, but itwas lacking which prematurely cut down the active support and realimprovements in their security tactics (Masoud 2015).

Itis critical to note that the White House has been against suchsupport and any re-expansion of the US mission in Afghanistan.Despite president Ghani raining the alarm on extension of ISISactivities in Afghanistan, the US has vowed to completely withdrawalall the troops come 2016. Only 1000 forces will be left to provideprotection to the US Embassy. On the other hand, NATO has announcedplans to bring in a small mission led by civilian military inAfghanistan after 2016. The commander of international coalitionforces in Afghanistan General John Campbell, the NATO mission willbe based in Kabul and would be under the NATO military contingent.This will include the forces from US protecting the embassy. The NATOforces at the base may occasionally be used to boost the intelligenceservice and air force in Afghanistan (Lyall, Blair and Imai 2014).

WhileNATO and US government have been debating on their role inAfghanistan after 2016, 2015 is appearing as the bloodiest year inhistory where many soldiers and civilians have lost their lives. InApril 2015, the reports by United Nations Assistance mission inAfghanistan (UNAMA) showed that the first three months in 2015 saw anincrease of 8 percent in civilian casualties when compared to sameperiod in 2014(Lyall,Blair and Imai 2014).Over 10,000 civilians died or were injured in 2014due to theon-going military conflict. This was the highest number recorded inhistory since the UN started keeping records. This was 22 percenthigher than it was in 2013.

Figure 7: Civilian Deaths andinjuries in Afghanistan: source, UN 2015

May2015 was characterised by significant deterioration of security andheavy clashes were reported in more than 10 provinces in Afghanistan.The minister for interior in Afghanistan, Noor-ul-Haq Ulumi, hadportrayed a graver increase in insecurity with 11 provinces being themost vulnerable to security threats. Ulumi has been blaming Pakistanfor the increased insecurity arguing that the military operations inAfghanistan in Northern border pushed the foreign fighters toAfghanistan and strengthened the insurgencies by Haqqani and Taliban(Mazhar, Samee and Naheed 2014).

Ironically,the US have over the years tried to pressure and persuade Pakistaniintelligence and military services to help in cracking down the safehavens for the anti-Pakistani militants and Afghan Taliban as theybelieve such a move can be critical in improving the securitysituation in Afghanistan. Though the Pakistan government was slow toact, the terrorist attack in summer of 2014 compelled the military inPakistan to conduct a comprehensive operation to eliminate all theinsurgent groups. This played a major role in fracturing the groupsbut some of the Afghan Taliban Network slipped into Afghanistan(Mazhar, Samee and Naheed 2014).

Asignificant deterioration in security is expected in 2015 in some ofthe major battlegrounds. Such attacks have affected even some areasin Afghanistan that were safe such as Ghor and Faryab(Williams 2015).The research shows that not all insecurity cases are as a result ofTaliban military efforts. Rather, some areas have experiencedinsecurity as a result of rivaling businessmen, politicians, tribesand power brokers amongst others. At times, insecurity has been uppedwith the intention of securing the government appointments. Suchviolent military and political contestation has allowed Taliban totake advantage of the conflicts, gain a crucial foothold, andstrengthen its position (Lee2015).

Influxof the foreign fighters who fly the black flags of ISIS are alsopartly to be blamed for the escalating violence in Kunduz andBadakhshan where Taliban has overrun the Afghan police and militaryoutposts and have been taking hostages the security forces inAfghanistan. The Taliban militia have been trying to overrun theprovincial capital forcing the afghan military to sendreinforcements. Such reinforcement means a decrease in number ofAfghan forces in Kunduz provincial leadership. This compelled therecruitment of about 1,000 forces with the hope that this would helpthem halt the progress of Taliban in the province. The training tookfew weeks and this was risky and considered as tried-and-failedtactic. Such militia cannot resist any insurgence from Talibanwithout strong back-up from ISAF, ANSF and United States (Lynch,2015).

Kunduzis among the major provinces in Afghanistan that experiencesextensive militia engagements. The area is frequently beholden to thehighly divisive powerbrokers that engage in predation of the localcommunities and majorly abuse the rival ethnic tribes and groups. Theprovince experiences discriminatory and fractious politics and thisact as a soft target for the Taliban who have also managed to createsupport groups to carry out insurgents (Lynch, 2015).

Thesouthern Afghanistan, Helmand, has experienced issues of insecurity.The section is intensely contested by the Taliban militia. Thepresident has tried to make the Afghan forces his own but this hasbeen antagonizing segment which has been pulling forces from Helmandbattlefield and keeping them on the eastern border. Such a move byGhani is considered costly and risky both in terms of effects on thestrength in battlefield and morale of the Taliban as well as hisnetworks that is critical in his support in Afghanistan. Such aprioritization fuels resentment of reconstituted Northern Alliance ofhis political rivals and alienates his support for the Pashtuns.Ghani can be considered to have little muscle when compared to mostof his rivals despite his intention of building closer relationshipwith his networks (Motwani and Bose 2015).

Futureof Afghanistan Government

Internationalcommunity

CounteringViolent Extremism (CVE) activities should be well strategized by theinternational community. Any attempts without proper planning canpotentially exacerbate the trends towards violent extremism whetherthrough exposure to reprisals or backlash against CVE efforts. Thereis great need to take upon practical measures to push back againstany violent extremists. The international community will be criticalin CVE efforts in Afghanistan though their role may be limited. Thisis because the government in Afghanistan is perceived as a puppet forforeign interests. Nevertheless, the CVE efforts should not beconsidered as being imposed by outside groups to avoid entrenchingthe ‘puppet’ critique of Afghanistan state(Auerswald and Saideman 2014).

Fromthe current situation, it is evident that Afghan government willdepend greatly on foreign aid in its CVE efforts. This implies that,although not inherently expensive, the CVE efforts in Afghanistanwill have to be funded internationally. The foreign funding ofinitiatives towards CVE poses a dilemma particularly when the foreigninterference is resented. The Afghan should hold a major role in theprogram design and implementationto ensure that internationalgroups are not exposed to outsiders, especially to extremist groups(Storch2015).

Apartfrom funding the CVE initiatives, international community may beinstrumental in strengthening the structure of the state. Theperformance and legitimacy of Afghan state is crucial in CVE toenable the international community promote issues such asanticorruption and other efforts meant to enhance legitimacy. As longas the Afghan government will rely on international funding,benchmarks for such funding should be rigorous and achievable.Penalties for not meeting the benchmarks should be real (Auerswaldand Saideman 2014).

Recommendationfor Afghan Civil Society, Donors and Religious Leaders

Itwill be unrealistic to develop a single CVE strategy for Afghan sincethe conditions vary considerably across various areas in Afghanistan.Grievance messages are mostly context-specific and this implies thatsuccess will require identification of intermediaries who are readyto reach out to the populations that are most vulnerable to extremistrecruitment and amenable engagement (Waldman2015).Therefore, detailed CVE programs should only be developed on eitherregional or provincial basis. Some practical recommendations include:

  • Provision of alternative activities and meeting spaces such as sports, education and culture to attract youths since they are the most vulnerable to recruitment into extremist groups. This may also include faith-based places where youths easily congregate and socialize. This will especially important among the marginalized youths who are always hungry to socialize with their peers.

  • Messaging materials should be offered to help Afghans focus on shared values like unity and peace in Islam. The messages and information should be tailored in a way that targets beneficiaries without being overly political. This is mainly because Afghan legal system has been criticized on being sharia-based.

  • The nonviolent Islamist groups must be engaged constructively with respect to their constant critiques for the Afghan state to express the need for them to participate in formulating the state policy and taking part in elections. The debates should moderate the religious scholars with difficult credentials in order to impugn and counter antigovernment rhetoric of nonviolent extremists.

  • The Islamist groups in Afghanistan should collaborate with the government in formulating programs that counter the ideologies of the violent extremist groups. The programs should be designed in a way that condemns violence and should ensure that various segments of the population to empower them on how to counter messages form overly liberal groups.

  • Religious leaders and Mullahs should work as partners in CVE. The religious leaders unwilling to associate with the government may play a key role in discouraging radicalization.

  • Support should be accorded to progressive political parties and youth associations. For instance, the Kabul-centric groups have become famous in recent years.

Recommendationfor the Government

TheAfghan government must first realize that extremist groups pose amajor threat to the country’s stability and should therefore devisea holistic and long-term strategy to counter such groups. Thegovernment should engage in programs that targets the general publicand extremist elements as well. This will be critical in reformingand improving the delivery of services as well as reduce corruption.Lack of committed state reforms may render other key components ofthe CVE unachievable and eventually lead to disillusionment to thosewho are ready to fight for the Afghan state.

Thegovernment should improve its legitimacy on Islamic grounds byworking with civilians on messaging as well as provide civileducation that emphasize on constitution and law in Afghan as beinggrounded on Islam. Anecdotally, very small proportion of Afghans isaware of the Islamic foundations of the state. A specific focusshould involve legal education and outreach in rule of law as a CVEmechanism and eliminate any suspicion of state.

Thecreation of awareness must begin first by engaging the religiousleaders who are considered as the most prominent. The governmentshould provide them with the information it requires disseminated aswell as engage them in a dialogue on the legal system and state.Successful leaders will be critical in facilitating meeting andspreading the message further. Also, the leaders may be instrumentalin making arrangements for the most isolated religious leaders toattend seminars and meetings to meet the wider civil society andgovernment officials. The engagement by the government of youths andpopulation which is most vulnerable to extremism should be direct andsystematic. Youths should be extensively involved in improving anddeveloping outreach messages to the wider community.

Itis imperative if the state stops acting alone and involve the widercivil society. Nevertheless, working with youths and religiousleaders requires careful identification of trusted and credibleindividuals. Such individuals can be potentially reached for outreachand dialogue after which they can be considered as partners in thefight against extremism.

References

Afghanistan:Country Outlook 2013.New York: The Economist Intelligence Unit.http://search.proquest.com/docview/1465064666?accountid=8289.

Auerswald,D. P., &amp Saideman, S. M. NATOin Afghanistan: fighting together, fighting alone.Princeton University Press, 2014

Bryman,A. SocialResearch Methods. (2ndEd.).Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Centerfor Army Lessons Learned, Afghanistanprovincial reconstruction team handbook: District stability framework(Create Space Independent Publishing Platform, 2011), 2015: 141- 152.

CIAWorld Factbook, 2015,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html(Accessed December 24, 2015).

Dalenberg,S., &amp Jansen, M. M. Two Ways of Leaving: A Comparative Case Studyon Exit Strategies of a UN and a NATO Led Mission. In&nbspNetherlandsAnnual Review of Military Studies 2015&nbsp(pp.217-245). TMC Asser Press, 2015.

Destradi,S. Regional Powers and Security Governance: ISAF Withdrawal, RegionalCompetition, and Domestic Norms in India`s Afghanistan Policy.&nbspAsianPerspective,&nbsp38(4),2014: 565-587.

Destradi,S. Regional Powers and Security Governance: ISAF Withdrawal, RegionalCompetition, and Domestic Norms in India`s Afghanistan Policy.&nbspAsianPerspective,&nbsp38(4),2014: 565-587.

Embassy,U. S. Six Month Consolidated War Powers Resolution Report December2014.

Frazil,R., Johnson, C., &amp Cooke, P. Understanding and Countering ViolentExtremism in Afghanistan, 2015.

Felbab-Brown,Vanda. Blood and Hope in Afghanistan: A June 2015 update. BrookingsMay 26.http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/05/26-isis-taliban-afghanistan-felbabbrown.(Accessed October 3, 2015).

GAOreport on security force assistance. 2013. Connections:The Quarterly Journal12, no. 2: 103-124,http://search.proquest.com/docview/1443263659?accountid=8289.(Accessed September 21, 2015).

Grassi,Daniele. 2014. Afghanistan’s uncertain future: The new unitygovernment is a diplomatic achievement, but its future looksdecidedly shaky. TheDiplomat,September 28.http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/afghanistans-uncertain-future/. (Accessed October 3, 2015).

Gross,A. A.&nbspAfghanNational Security Forces (ANSF) Logistics Management SystemSupport&nbsp(No.CAA-2012225). Center for army analysis fort BELVOIR VA, 2014.

Javaid,Umbreen and Farhat Nasreen. Liquidation of American Forces fromAfghanistan: Its impacts on the region. SouthAsian StudiesVol 28, No. 2: 307-315, 2013

Jedinger,A., &amp Mader, M. Predispositions, Mission-Specific Beliefs, andPublic Support for Military Missions: The Case of the German ISAFMission in Afghanistan.&nbspInternationalJournal of Public Opinion Research,27(1),2015: 90-110.

Khalilzad,Zalmay. 2014. A new start for Afghanistan: 3 massive challenges thatwill decide its future. The national Interest, October 20.http://nationalinterest.org/feature/new-start-afghanistan-5-massive-challenges-will-decide-its-11501?page=2.(Accessed October 3, 2015).

Kumar,R. ResearchMethodology – A Step by Step Guide for Beginners.(2ndEd.). London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2005.

Lang,J. Afghanistan: the view from Russia.&nbspEuropeanUnion Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved from European UnionInstitute for Security Studies: http://www. Iss. Europa.eu/fr/publications/detail-gage/article/afghanistan-the-view-from-russia.,2015.

Laub,Z. The Taliban in Afghanistan.&nbspCouncilon Foreign Relations.2014.

Lee,J. A Case for Pragmatic, Minimalist Approaches to the AfghanistanWar.&nbspJournalArticle| Aug,&nbsp25(4),2015: 37.

Lyall,J., Blair, G., &amp Imai, K. Afghan civilians are much more tolerantof harm from the Taliban than they are from ISAF.&nbspLSEAmerican Politics and Policy,2014.

LynchIII, T. F. After ISIS: Fully Reappraising US Policy inAfghanistan.&nbspTheWashington Quarterly,&nbsp38(2),2015: 119-144.

Masoud,Fahim. Afghanistan’s Future: Interview with Amrullah Saleh.InternationalPolicy Digest,26 August.http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2015/08/26/afghanistan-s-future-interview-with-amrullah-saleh/(Accessed October 3, 2015).

Mazhar,Muhammad Saleem, Samee Ozair Khan, and Naheed S. Goraya. 2013. Post2014-afghanistan. SouthAsian Studies28, No 1, pp. 67-84,http://search.proquest.com/docview/1369670723?accountid=8289.(Accessed September 21, 2015).

Motwani,N., &amp Bose, S. Afghanistan: ‘spoilers’ in the regionalsecurity context.&nbspAustralianJournal of International Affairs,&nbsp69(3),2015: 266-284.

Shahrani,N. M. The Impact of the 2014 US-NATO Withdrawal on the InternalPolitics of Afghanistan: Karzai-style Thugocracy or TalibanTheocracy? AsianSurvey,&nbsp55(2),2015: 273-298.

Smith,B. Prospects for Afghanistan as ISAF withdrawal approaches.Economic Indicators,&nbsp4,14.

Storch,Thomas. 2015. Afghanistan’s precarious future. WorldAffairs Journal,April 23.http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/thomas-storch/afghanistan%E2%80%99s-precarious-future(Accessed October 3, 2015).

Waldman,Matt. “System Failure: The Underlying Causes of US Policy-MakingErrors in Afghanistan.” InternationalAffairs, Vol.89, No. 4 (July 2013), pp. 825-843,https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/ia/archive/view/193087(accessed September 21, 2015).

Williams,B. G. The Drone Campaign against Al Qaeda and ISIS: Interview withLt. General David Deptula USAF (Ret.).&nbspPerspectiveson Terrorism,&nbsp9(3),2015.

Appendix

Table 2: Military and CivilianCasualties in Afghanistan

Source: Ministry of Defense First published: 18 February 2014 Lastupdated: 15 January 2015

Year

&nbsp

Casualties (excluding Natural Causes)

&nbsp

Field Hospital Admissions

&nbsp

Aeromed Evacuations

&nbsp

Total

Very Seriously Injured or Wounded

Seriously Injured or Wounded

&nbsp

Total

Wounded in Action

Disease or Non Battle Injury

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

Total

&nbsp

616

&nbsp

306

&nbsp

310

&nbsp

&nbsp

7,443

&nbsp

2,188

&nbsp

5,255

&nbsp

&nbsp

7,400

&nbsp

2001

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

2002

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

2003

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

2004

&nbsp

6

&nbsp

3

&nbsp

3

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

2005

&nbsp

2

&nbsp

2

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

2006

&nbsp

31

&nbsp

18

&nbsp

13

&nbsp

&nbsp

240

&nbsp

85

&nbsp

155

&nbsp

&nbsp

262

&nbsp

2007

&nbsp

63

&nbsp

23

&nbsp

40

&nbsp

&nbsp

832

&nbsp

234

&nbsp

598

&nbsp

&nbsp

572

&nbsp

2008

&nbsp

65

&nbsp

27

&nbsp

38

&nbsp

&nbsp

1,008

&nbsp

235

&nbsp

773

&nbsp

&nbsp

800

&nbsp

2009

&nbsp

157

&nbsp

82

&nbsp

75

&nbsp

&nbsp

1,229

&nbsp

508

&nbsp

721

&nbsp

&nbsp

1,313

&nbsp

2010

&nbsp

154

&nbsp

80

&nbsp

74

&nbsp

&nbsp

1,262

&nbsp

518

&nbsp

744

&nbsp

&nbsp

1,225

&nbsp

2011

&nbsp

69

&nbsp

34

&nbsp

35

&nbsp

&nbsp

921

&nbsp

274

&nbsp

647

&nbsp

&nbsp

1,147

&nbsp

2012

&nbsp

44

&nbsp

23

&nbsp

21

&nbsp

&nbsp

952

&nbsp

222

&nbsp

730

&nbsp

&nbsp

1,121

&nbsp

2013

&nbsp

17

&nbsp

10

&nbsp

7

&nbsp

&nbsp

742

&nbsp

95

&nbsp

647

&nbsp

&nbsp

613

&nbsp

2014

&nbsp

6

&nbsp

3

&nbsp

3

&nbsp

&nbsp

257

&nbsp

17

&nbsp

240

&nbsp

&nbsp

347

&nbsp

Nov-13

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

51

&nbsp

4

&nbsp

47

&nbsp

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

Dec-13

&nbsp

2

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

2

&nbsp

&nbsp

31

&nbsp

4

&nbsp

27

&nbsp

&nbsp

24

&nbsp

Jan-14

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

37

&nbsp

2

&nbsp

35

&nbsp

&nbsp

35

&nbsp

Feb-14

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

&nbsp

27

&nbsp

Mar-14

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

&nbsp

29

&nbsp

4

&nbsp

25

&nbsp

&nbsp

29

&nbsp

Apr-14

&nbsp

2

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

&nbsp

26

&nbsp

May-14

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

&nbsp

40

&nbsp

Jun-14

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

&nbsp

25

&nbsp

2

&nbsp

23

&nbsp

&nbsp

28

&nbsp

Jul-14

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

23

&nbsp

4

&nbsp

19

&nbsp

&nbsp

54

&nbsp

Aug-14

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

23

&nbsp

4

&nbsp

19

&nbsp

&nbsp

43

&nbsp

Sep-14

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

14

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

13

&nbsp

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

Oct-14

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

3

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

3

&nbsp

&nbsp

16

&nbsp

Nov-14

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

10

&nbsp

Dec-14

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

4

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

4

&nbsp

&nbsp

6

&nbsp

Source: Initial NOTICAS

Source: UK and Coalition Medical Facilities

Source: AECC

1. Data starts 7 October 2001.

2. The latest three months of data are provisional and subject to change.

3. The VSI and SI data includes personnel with an initial NOTICAS listing of VSI or SI who were alive at the time of discharge from their first hospital episode in the UK.

4. The VSI and SI injury data includes records classified as `Other Causes`. This classification is used when there is insufficient information to attribute a casualty to injury or natural cause.

5. Civilians are not included in the figures previous to 1 January 2006.

6. The personnel listed as VSI or SI may also appear in the UK field hospital admissions and aeromed evacuations data.

7. The admissions data contain UK personnel admitted to any field hospital, whether operated by UK or Coalition Medical Facilities.

8. The disease or non-battle injury figures are non-battle injuries only until 27 October 2006 disease is included from 28 October to be consistent with Op TELIC reporting.

9. Field Hospital Admissions data starts 1 March 2006.

10. Data from the Role 3 UK Medical Facility at Camp Bastion ceased on 22 September 2014 due to its closure. From 22 September 2014 field hospital admissions data is sourced from Coalition Medical Facilities only.

Close Menu