Dissertation The Future of Afghanistan Government

  • Uncategorized

Tableof Contents

List of Figures 4

List of Tables 4

Abstract 5

Introduction 6

1.1. Background to the Research 6

1.2. Research Problem 7

1.3. Aims and Objectives of the Research 8

1.4. Research questions 8

1.5. Scope and Significance of the Research 8

1.6. Structure of the Research 9

1.7. Hypotheses 9

2.0. Literature Review 11

2.1. Introduction 11

2.2. Security Status of Afghani Government 13

2.3. Dedication of local population towards achievement of long-term stability 16

2.4. Critical causes of insecurity within the country and possible methods of suppressing the threats 16

2.4.1. Prolonged Presidential Elections 16

2.4.2. National Unity Government 17

2.4.3. Withdrawal of ISAF 19

2.5. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 23

2.6. Measures used towards addressing insecurity issues 24

2.7. Theoretical Framework/Approach 27

3.0. Methodology 29

3.1. Introduction 29

3.2. Research Philosophy 29

3.3. Research Design 29

3.4. Pragmatic Research Approach 30

3.5. Sampling and Selection 30

3.6. Data Collection 31

3.6.1. Secondary Data collection 31

3.7. Data Analysis 32

3.8. Justification of the Research 32

3.8.1. Reasons for choosing Secondary Research 32

3.9. Validity and Reliability of the Research 32

3.10. Ethical Considerations 33

3.11. Limitations of the Research 33

3.12. Conclusion of Chapter Three 33

4.0. Results and Findings 34

4.1. Introduction 34

4.2. Sources of Secondary Data Analyzed 34

4.3. Themes 34

4.3.1. Community perception on extremism 34

4.3.2. Competency of presidency in fighting insecurity 36

4.3.3. Effects of presidential elections 36

4.3.4. Problems facing ANSF 38

4.3.5. Taliban Insurgence 38

4.3.6. Future of Afghanistan government 39

5.0. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 41

Future of Afghanistan Government 51

International community 51

Recommendation for Afghan Civil Society, Donors and Religious Leaders 52

Recommendation for the Government 53

References 55

Appendix 58

List of Figures

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan 6

Figure 2: ISAF Withdrawal from Afghanistan 20

Figure 3: Infographic on number of troops in Afghanistan: source: ARRSE 21

Figure 4: How to solve insecurity problems facing Afghanistan 25

Figure 5: Conceptual Framework 27

Figure 6: Insider threats in Afghanistan 47

Figure 7: Civilian Deaths and injuries in Afghanistan: source UN 2015 49

List ofTables

Table 1: Sources of Secondary Data 34

Table 2: Military and Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan 58

Abstract

This research paper investigates the future of Afghanistangovernment. The international Security Assistance Force (ISAF) hasrecently withdrawn from Afghanistan where the full responsibility ofnational security is now being transferred to Afghan NationalSecurity Forces (ANSF). Nevertheless, the progress in transition ofthe security responsibility has been minimal. Uncertainty on futureof Afghan government is hanging like a dark cloud in horizon. Thegovernment in Afghanistan is unable to sustain the war fightingefforts and this has propelled the mistrust between the warringgroups.

This thesis focused determining the preparation of the securityforces in suppressing ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents in aneffort to maintain the state security even after the exit ofinternational military. The results of the study indicate thatAfghanistan is currently incapable of fighting the extremist groups.One of the major factors affecting them is inadequate resources andincreasing number of jihadist in the region who are fighting to gaincontrol of the different territories.

Keywords: ISAF, ANSF, Taliban, Insurgent, ISIS, Al QaedaAfghan Armed Forces (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), AfghanBorder Police (ABP), Afghan Local Police (ALP), the NationalDirectorate of Security (NDS)

Introduction

    1. Background to the Research

Afghanistan has a long history of insecurity. In the 1970s, theUnited States backed Mujahedeen insurgents to combat the Soviet Armythat has invaded the country. It accomplished the objective throughprovision of military training, financial support and weapon supply.Although, The U.S never engaged in direct confrontation with theSoviet, one of its greatest economic rivals, it celebrated the USSRwithdrawal from Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the joy was short-livedbecause the Mujahedeen began power-struggle in the 1990s. Soon, theconflict escalated into conflict that threatened the entireMiddle-East region.

Figure1: Map of Afghanistan

The Taliban insurgents, backed by the Al-Qaeda managed to establish amilitary regime in the country. While the U.S and the world allowedthe Taliban groups to thrive, it gradually turned into a terroristgroup, with the peak of its extremism leading to 9/11 attacks thatcatapulted the U.S and its Western allies to launch a militaryintervention for curbing Taliban terrorism in 2009. Besides, it aimedto establish a democratic government that would help to suppressextremism and continued radicalization. Finally, the western alliesannounced that its military expedition in the country was over in2014. It passed the governorship of the country to the National UnityGovernment. So far, the administration trend indicates that theAfghan National Security Forces including Afghan Armed Forces (ANA),Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), AfghanLocal Police (ALP) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS)cannot provide the necessary security for the population and survivalof the central government.

    1. Research Problem

Thegovernment in Afghanistan faces unique challenges amidst which it issupposed to survive without any assistance from the U.S. troops. Thepopulation in Afghanistan is no longer quiescent and isolated. Everygroup within the population has been politically and militarilymobilized due to penetration of armed militants within their habitatwho compete to radicalize many young men. This has increased therecruitment of the Afghans into national ideological or ethnicpolitics. As such many coping mechanism amongst the Afghans isbecoming increasingly less reliable and most of them have beenrelying on the government for their livelihoods and provision ofpublic services. However, the demands placed on government aregreater and task for legitimation more demanding than any other timein history. Currently, the licit GDP is 7 percent equivalent to$960million. This is not enough to cover the recurrent nondefensecosts and with the increase in number of defense forces in thecountry, then the probability of finance the defense costs remain amirage.

Under thesestate of transnational and external threats in addition to themounting domestic demands, the stability of Afghanistan require thesecurity forces be equipped with all the necessary capabilities andresources. In light of this, the current research sought tofill the information gap concerning the military power of the AfghanArmy. Some critics claim it cannot withstand the firepower of theinsurgents associated with the terrorist groups. Using pragmaticanalysis of the most recent Afghanistan data, the study sought toestablish whether the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)has adequately trained the Afghani armed forces to combat theextremists (Center for Army Lessons Learned 141).

    1. Aims and Objectives of the Research

The main objective of the current research was to investigate thepossibility of the Afghani government in maintaining the statesecurity after the exit of international military from the country.

    1. Research questions
  1. What is the security implication of withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan?

  2. Which security setups such as institutions, agencies and organizations exist in Afghanistan is likely to continue operating even after the exit of ISAF?

  3. What are some of the interests of outside forces in Afghanistan?

  4. Is there a link between security environment and Afghanistan and how does the external influences affect peace and security?

    1. Scope and Significance of the Research

Afghanistan has continued to be unsafe and chaotic under theleadership of president Ghani and formation of Unity Government.Therefore, this research will help determine the reasons for theincreased incoherence and insecurity in the country and propose somemeasures that will help mitigate such effects. Fighting withextremist groups such as Taliban is not only hindered by increasedradicalization of the youths but also it is by the fact that somegovernment officials are feared to overthrow the government based onthe fact that they were initially Taliban militants. The stability ofthe government and defense forces is of paramount importance as faras security is concerned. With the exit of US funding and foreigntroops, the future of Afghanistan government lies at stake. Thisresearch therefore brings out the current state in Afghanistan andevaluates the preparedness of the government in fighting insecurity.

    1. Structure of the Research

The current paper comprises of five chapters. Chapter one is theintroduction, chapter two presents the review of literature, chapterthree is the methodology, chapter four resents the findings andanalysis, and finally chapter five presents the discussion andconclusion of the research.

    1. Hypotheses

This research will be based on the following hypotheses.

H1: The Afghan National Security Forces including Afghan Armed Forces(ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Police (ABP),Afghan Local Police (ALP) and the National Directorate of Security(NDS) provide the necessary security for the population and survivalof the central government.

H0: The Afghan National Security Forces including Afghan Armed Forces(ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Police (ABP),Afghan Local Police (ALP) and the National Directorate of Security(NDS) do not provide the necessary security for the population andsurvival of the central government.

CHAPTERTWO

2.0. Literature Review2.1. Introduction

According to Javaid and Farhat (2013, 312), the departure of theforeign troops will allow attract the foreign fighters into thecountry. Subsequently, the transition regime will collapse. Theformer Taliban Army will also regroup quickly and establish a stronginsurgence that wills easily allow it to conquer Afghanistan.Finally, the resource notes that increased instability will finallylead into a grueling civil fight between the government troops andthe rebels. Waldman (2013) echoes similar sentiments that the AfghanSecurity forces lack the capacity to protect both the citizens andthe central government. He admits that the United States’ militaryintervention in 2001 has facilitated development in some key sectors,but the Taliban forces are still strong. Nevertheless, the exit offoreign forces can guarantee no long-term stability since thedisbanded fighters will likely come back to reclaim their formerthrone (Waldman 2013, 832-836). Storch (2015) points out theincreased suicide attacks in Afghanistan by bombers affiliated to theIslamic State is a warning the Afghan Armed Forces will be even morevulnerable when the foreign forces withdraw. Furthermore, themajority of the people in the armed forces are former Talibanofficials who have been incorporated in the government. As such, theywill most likely change loyalty, and establish insurgency that willoverthrow the unity government. The researcher uses critical analysisof the events that followed in 1989 withdrawal of the Soviet forces. The unstable political environment provided a suitable base forterrorist groups to thrive. Once the foreign forces move out of thenation, similar chaos will follow, and the insurgents will easilyoverthrow the present coalition government (Storch 2015). He usescase studies of a previous coalition government in other states toconclude that such government systems are rarely successful. On thesame note, the country lacks adequate resources to sustain itsgovernment. The economy growth is weak, and the natural resourcesremain extensively unexploited. Since it has no potential strategy topay its armed forces, the armies will most likely disband as soon asforeign assistance ceases. On the long run, different insurgents willcome up and begin fighting for the limited resources, and theconflict will escalate into a civil war that the government cannotrestrain (Grassi 2014).

Felbab-Brown (2015) uses a pragmatic analysis method to review thepresent security threats facing Afghanistan such as Al-Qaeda andTaliban groups, as well as its affiliated insurgents such asHezeb-el-Islami, Haqqani and ISIS, are still vibrant in the region.Therefore, the weak Afghani forces will be overthrown within a shorttime after the international troops withdraw (Felbab-Brown 2015). Ina national broadcast interview, Amrullah Saleh asserted that theAfghani armed forces have the capacity to protect its citizens sincePakistan has enhanced its support for the Taliban. Secondly, thecountry is already politically divided after the prolonged standoffthat resulted from the previously contested elections. The NationalUnity Government is extremely volatile, and a little disagreementamong the principals will lead to exacerbating insurgency fighting.

Practically, extensive research studies indicate that the Afghanistanarmed forces are propped on the foreign firepower. However, thisapproach is biased because the NATO troops have gradually trained andtransferred the military responsibility to Afghani armed forces overa long period. Khalilzad (2015) asserts that the National SecurityForces including Afghan Armed Forces (ANA), Afghan National Police(ANP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan Local Police (ALP) and theNational Directorate of Security (NDS) have been trained adequatelyto handle the country’s security matters. Therefore, the myth thatthe military lacks the power and intelligence to handle securitymatters without NATO assistance holds no water.

In summary, if the security forces will fail to deliver its mandate,the disappointment will result from internal management wranglesassociated with the Government of National Unity. Afghanistan may notbe a wealthy country, and withdraw of the US military, and financialassistance will deny the people some services they are currentlyenjoying. The foreign military process has strategized the withdrawalprocess in a way that that will ensure the local military hasadequate experience to run the country. In fact, the process wasaccomplished within four years, which is enough period to prepare thelocal troops.

2.2. Security Status of Afghani Government

Currently, there is growing concern over the capacity of the army andsecurity forces in Afghan to fight insecurity. According to NATOreports in November 2014, current level of casualties isunsustainable (Giustozzi, 18November 2014, p. 5). There is uncertainty on the ability of thesecurity forces in Afghanistan to hold the government heldterritories as well as retaking the insurgent-controlled areas. Assuch, the security concern for the Afghan population remains a majorconcern. (HRW, 21&nbspJanuary 2014). While the security forces inAfghanistan have demonstrated ability to retake and clear thecontested areas, the progress and control remain contingent indelivery of social services and governance (UNGA, 9 December 2014, p.5).

Since the end of ISAF’s combat role in Afghanistan, ANSF has beenperforming reasonably well in their encounters with Taliban.Nevertheless, there have been spectacular failures in their defensefor Kunduz where 7,000 security personnel cannot defend the cityagainst Taliban’s assault. This portrays the weakness of ANSF infighting within the urban settings. According to reports by analysts,the failure of ANSF relates to poor leadership and diminishing morale(CACI, 15&nbspOctober 2015)

Corruption

Nepotism, cronyism and corruptionsare rampant in all government institutions, and unfortunately, theinadequate salaries have been a major driver for corruption amongstthe public employees. Afghans perceive the civil service andjudiciary as the most corrupt with media and religious bodies asleast corrupt (Freedom House, 23&nbspJanuary 2014).

The capability and size of the governing structure in Afghanistan hasincreased considerably since the fall of Taliban regime in late 2001though the government is still wallowing in corruption, political andethnic tensions (CRS, 4 November2014, Summary).

International SecurityAssistance Force (ISAF)

The UN-mandated ISAF was under themanagement of NATO since 2003 and it completed its expansion ofreconstruction and security mission in 2006. Despite the addition oftroops from U.S. and other countries, the development of the Afghanforces remained under the military commanders, warlords, pettybandits and drug traffickers. Meanwhile, resurgent of Talibanincreased attacks to the international forces and Afghan governmentextending their influence on vast areas, especially the southernparts of Kandahar and Helmand, North and West Afghanistan (FreedomHouse, January 2013)

The insurgent groups did not targetthe ISAF or the U.S. in their attacks. Rather, their main objectivewas to render the Afghan government and ANSF powerless. This madethem engage in selective political and military warfare (CSIS, 9&nbspMay2012, pp.&nbsp10-11). In January 2014, the responsibilities offledging ANSF started to increase following the transition of thesecurity responsibility from ISAF. Withdrawal of foreign troops wasreferred to as ‘reset and retrograde operations’. The transitionperiod was in five tranches where the final tranche occurred in June2013 (UK Home Office, August 2014, p.&nbsp13) after thegovernment signed deals with U.S. and NATO. The agreement allowed theforeign troops to continue staying in the country even after the yearends. As part of the agreement regarding the withdrawal of foreigntroops, 12,000 NATO soldiers were to remain in Afghanistan to adviseand train the ANSF (BBC News, 11December 2014)

Insurgents Groups

The anti-government elementsinvolved all armed groups and individuals who were involved inconflicts against the government and international military forces.This included the Taliban and other non-state armed groups that tookpart in direct hostilities and assumed variety of labels likeHezb-e-Islami, Haqqani Network, Islamic Jihad Union, Islamic Movementof Uzbekistan and other armed militia groups that pursued economic,ideological and political objectives that conflicted with the rulinggovernment (UNAMA, August 2015, p.&nbsp2, footnote 5).Taliban remains the core insurgent faction in Afghan. The PakistaniTaliban majorly challenges the Pakistani government and also supportsthe Taliban group in Afghanistan (CRS,15&nbspOctober 2015, pp.&nbsp18-19). On the other hand, theHizb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin (HIG) hasbeen in conflict with Taliban over the control of territories. TheHIG group mainly targets the high-profile attacks (CRS, 15&nbspOctober2015, p.&nbsp21).

The U.S. officials have all alongconsidered Al Qaeda to be less hostile in Afghanistan though theymostly act as facilitator for the insurgent groups. Nevertheless,according to outside experts, Al-Qaeda is more active than what theassessments indicate. Much is being reported on Islamic States inAfghanistan with some surveys citing the government officials asmajor indicators of the IS presence (Osman, 12&nbspFebruary 2015).The period between November 2014 and November 2015 was characterizedby a 10.6 percent increase in security-related activities. This waspartially attributed to the increased anti-government activities inmild winter season that favored the continuity of conflicts (UNGA, 27February 2015, p. 4).

According to United NationsAssistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), several Afghans have beenkilled in battles in early 2015 leading to an 8 percent increase fromthe previous 2014. Also, the Afghan and U.S. officials recorded anincrease in ANSF casualties by 70 percent in 2015.

The withdrawal of NATO in December2014 resulted to a decrease in the number of ISAF in Afghan from130,000 to around 12,000. This implied that the Taliban were probablystronger after the exit of NATO forces. This led to an increase inthe inter-faction clashes and insurgents from the Islamic State ofAfghan territory as well as the expansion of Taliban activities tothe north of the country (New York Times 28/07/2015).

2.3. Dedication of local population towards achievement of long-termstability

The main operational efforts of ISAF entailed protection of thepopulation that was most threatened within the Taliban-led insurgencyin Kandahar and Helmand provinces. The working together of ISAF andANSF necessitated numerous counterinsurgency operations inAfghanistan. Media reports indicate that Pakistani Taliban group hasbeen supporting Afghan Taliban. Due to the withdrawal of foreigntroops, the Pakistani personnel have been staging their attacks tothe population in Afghanistan with unprecedented confidence.

2.4. Critical causes of insecurity within the country and possiblemethods of suppressing the threats2.4.1. Prolonged Presidential Elections

The presidential elections in April2014 was characterized by a second round run-off after thecandidates Mr Abdullah (45 percent of total votes) and Mr Ghani(31.6 percent of total votes), failed to garner more than 50 percentof the votes. After the second round, Mr. Ghani won with 55 percentbut both candidates declared themselves victorious. This led topolitical crisis and was feared to cause the civil unrests.

An agreement was made for a UnityGovernment where Ghani was to serve as the president and Abdullah asthe chief executive. The Elections were said to be marred by extremefraud similar to previous elections since the ousting of Talibanregime in 2001 (AFP, 26&nbspSeptember 2014). One year afterthe two entered into a power sharing agreement, the progress has notbeen recorded. The Taliban has been capitalizing on the situation inthe country by launching numerous attacks in various provinces. TheANSF have been dying at an average rate of 100 per month. This hasbeen termed as the bloodiest fighting since the war on terror began.Nevertheless, it is expected that Abdullah and Ghani demonstrate thefinancial capabilities of a country to alleviate the financial woesin Afghanistan.

2.4.2. National Unity Government

This has made the government to experience prolonged turbulence.The insurgency of Taliban had received backing from nervous nuclearstates that depended on d’etre on hegemony, militancy andextremism. Reports indicate that the government has failed in itsdelivery and competence. The government is facing crisis inmanagement and leadership. The peace talks have not been conducted inthe most appropriate way as the major agenda revolves around theinterests of Taliban. Some people feel that such peace talks appeasethe Taliban.

The national unity government has been characterized by institutionaland personal divisions between the Abdullah and Ghani. The varyingand multiple bases of authority have attracted new administrativeappointments compelling the president and executive officer to beinvolved in constant negotiation and renegotiation of political pactsthat were agreed upon. It has taken months of delays andhorse-trading for the national unity government to agree onappointment of 25 provincial governors and 27 cabinet ministers. Suchwrangling has massively affected the effectiveness of the unitygovernment. The scheduled 2015 elections were postponed indefinitelywith the terms of current members of parliament being extended untilnew elections are held. This has resulted in many young Afghanslosing confidence with the government and has been massively leavingthe country since 2014. This alongside the exit of the ISAF has ledto Afghan economy stagnating and rate of unemployment increasingsignificantly.

The negative effects on the legitimacy of government have beensevere. According to recent polls by ATR consulting and TOLO News,majority of the population is not satisfied at all with the currentgovernment. A detailedanalysis of the appointments by the government reflects a shift inpower from the former jihadi elites to western educated technocrats.The influential and power figures such as traditional religiousauthorities and liberal reformers have been scraped off frompolitical circle. Instead, governors are the ones compelled tocompete with men in charge of sources of finance and security.

Such a sudden drift in poweris considered risky as it undermines the logic of post-2001Afghanistan state where the ethno-regional patrons played a majorrole in controlling the strategic sections of the economy and polityin Afghanistan. Before 2014, deputy ministerial and gubernatorialposts were under the extended patronage network of Hamid Karzai.Today, Abdullah and Ghani compete in appointing their own candidatesfor the similar positions. Their appointments are said to undo thebases of political stability and order in Afghanistan. The previousgovernment by Karzai succeed because of the ability to maintainequilibrium amongst the competing centres of power and ethno-regionalleaders.

In an effort to control hispower, the president has been relying on informal patronage. Reportsindicate that he has intentionally side-lined IndependentAdministrative Reform and Civil Service Commission that isresponsible for appointing the civil servants. The recentadministrative appointments exacerbates identity-based grievancesespecially the ethnicization of Afghan bureaucracy. The recentadministrative appointments reflect the intensification of patronagepolitics based on ethnicity. This has undermined the moral authorityof the president and set a platform for abuse by his juniors.

Patronage and ethnicizationprovides an opportunity and space for ethno-regional leaders toexcel. Recently, there have been debates on biometric identity cardswhere spoilers are intensifying ethnic rhetoric for personal gains.The leaders in Unity Government mustavoid at all cost any scenario that may mirror the instability inIraq where state underwent fragmentation along ethnic lines. Ethnicdivisions in Afghanistan can strengthen the ISIS and Taliban amongstother extremist groups. Currently, what Afghanistan need is ethnicharmony and unity. The unity government should overcome thedifferences in appointments as well as control the state resources.This will ensure that future appointments are fair and equal.

2.4.3. Withdrawal of ISAF

The ISAF and U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan hastriggered debates on the impacts it will have both in Afghanistan andinternational level. Before the withdrawal of U.S. and peacefultransition of power, Ghani had risen into power replacing Karzai asthe president of Afghanistan.

Figure2: ISAF Withdrawal from Afghanistan

The withdrawal of the ISAF is considered a hugesecurity challenge for the new unit government. As a result, Ghanisigned an agreement where approximately 12,000 troops, mostly fromU.S. were to remain in Afghanistan till the end of 2015 during whichthey were to train and support the forces in Afghanistan as well asjoining hands in fighting the Taliban. Withdrawal of the ISAF havesignificant impacts on Afghanistan and immediate issue facingAfghanistan security since the Taliban are still very powerful andcontinue to attack the Afghan police and western forces despite thejoint efforts by Afghan security and foreign troops to maintainsecurity in Afghanistan for 13 years.

Figure3: Infographic on number of troops in Afghanistan: source: ARRSE

Though the Afghan army and NATO have been trainingthe Afghan police using their own program, the training can beconsidered to be very far away from being complete. It is allegedthat Pakistan if fully supporting Taliban in terms of weaponry,shelter and financial support. This renders the Afghan army is stilltoo weak to counter Taliban. According to some experts, Afghanistanproduces 99 percent of the world’s opium. This is equivalent tothree quarters of the total Afghan GDP. The withdrawal of the USforces is expected to saw a radical increase in production which willmostly benefit Taliban since their main source of funding is drugbusiness.

Survey shows that 90 percent of the budget inAfghanistan’s economy comes from foreign aid since the country hasbecome dependent on foreign aid. Unfortunately, World Bank expressedits intentions to withdraw its funding upon withdrawal of ISAF fromAfghanistan. This implies that the economy in Afghanistan willcollapse. After the American occupation, many social reforms wereintroduced which included giving equal rights to women and promotionof education for the Afghan children. It is feared that US withdrawalwill render the reforms very weak and giving an upper hand toTaliban. Nevertheless, the major issue is that the withdrawal of U.S.will encourage the deterioration of balance of power within theregion with some countries like Iraq andPakistan.

The greatest challenge in Afghanistan is Pakistan which has beensupporting Taliban since 1980s and its close relationship with AfghanTaliban. According to experts, the intelligence agencies in Pakistanhave been playing the double games in that U.S. has been funding themto fight terrorism but instead, they support Taliban both financiallyand militarily. The Pakistan protects and nurtures the Taliban hencereactivating the Taliban to destabilize the current government. Thisis an effort to bring into power people who sympathize with Pakistan.

Balochistan on Afghan border have been supporting Afghanistan but thewithdrawal of US forces is feared to have negative effects onBalochistan. The Balochistan leader has been recorded saying inrecent statement that Pakistan have expansionist designs where itplays a major role in destroying the peace in their neighboringcountries. He also said that Balochistan occupation and terrorism inAfghanistan are some of the expansionist design of Pakistan. Theleader also advocated for the limitation of Pakistan to its bordersin Punjab. Therefore, Baloch and other secular nations should besupported in their fight for freedom and protected from the influenceof Pakistan in their expansionist philosophy of destroying the peacein Afghanistan. Also, Marri, the Baloch Leader, has urged U.S. toreview its assistance to Pakistan since Pakistan used the US aid tosupport terrorism in Afghanistan as well as oppress the people inBaloch.

2.5. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

Theinvasion of Afghanistan by Soviet Union can be likened by the currentsituation surrounding Afghanistan. In December 1979, the Soviet Uniontroops invaded Afghanistan. Soviet supported the communist governmentwhich was in conflict with the anti-communist guerrillas and theyremained in Afghanistan until February 1989. The centrist governmentin Afghanistan was overthrown in 1978 by left-wing military officers.This led to a power sharing deal between Khalq and Parcham parties.The two parties reunited shortly before the coup. The newly formedgovernment was less popular and they forged ties with Soviet Unionand launched a ruthless purge on all the domestic opposition andbegan an extensive social and land reforms that were resented deeplyby devout Muslim and anti-Communist population.

Therewere insurgencies that arose to fight against the government amongthe urban and tribal groups popularly known as mujahedeen. Theuprisings and internal fighting prompted Soviets to invadeAfghanistan in 1979 and sent over 30,000 troops to topple the shortlived presidency under the leadership of hafizullah Amin. The mainobjective of Soviet was to prop up their faltering client state underthe leadership of Babrak Karmal though Karmal was unable to getsignificant popular support.

The Mujahedeen continued to expand under the support of United Statesand spread over all sections in the country. Initially, Soviets werecompelled to leave the suppression of rebellion to Afghanistan army.Unfortunately, the army was beset by extensive desertions and wasmostly ineffective throughout the war period.

The war settled down quickly into a stalemate where over 100,000troops from soviet controlled larger towns, major garrisons andcities while Mujahedeen moved freely throughout the countryside. Soviet had tried by all means to crush insurgents but guerrillaseluded their attacks. This compelled Soviet to attempt eliminatingthe civilians’ support to Mujahedeen by depopulating and bombingrural areas. This sparked massive flight from countryside with over2.8 million Afghans seeking asylum in Pakistan in 1982 while another1.5 million fled to Iran. Eventually, Mujahedeen was able toneutralize the air power from the Soviet by using shoulder-firedaircrafts missiles that were supplied by United States, which was acold war adversary of Soviet Union (Destradi2014).

Thereafter there was political fragmentation of Mujahedeen intoindependent groups and their military was uncoordinated throughoutthe year. The quality of their combat organization and arms improvedgradually thanks to the large quantity of arms and war materialshipped by United States and other sympathetic Muslims via Pakistan.In addition, an indeterminate number of Afghan-Arabs travelled fromdifferent parts of the word to join the opposition. This made the warin Afghanistan to become a quagmire. The Soviet Union starteddisintegrating by late 1980s where the war left over 15,000 Sovietsdead and hundreds injured. Though they failed in implementing asympathetic regime in Afghanistan, Soviet Union signed an agreementwith United States in 1988 where Afghanistan and Pakistan were towithdraw their troops. In 1989, Soviet Union withdrew fromAfghanistan and the country returned to its original non-alignedstatus (Destradi 2014).

2.6. Measures used towards addressing insecurity issues

The contribution of ISAF to the development of ASI and ANSF leavesbehind a strong foundation from which the Afghanistan can start from. Placed in historical context, development of ANSF can be considereda remarkable success story. Currently, there are over 350,000 ANSFforces in control of Afghan security in 34 provincial capitals andmajor cities. The ANSF is in charge of all the security operationswhere they protect the population during public events involvedmasses such as Nazar e-Sherif festival. The Taliban have failed inmaking territorial gains in 2014 despite their direct target to ANSFcheckpoints. This reflects the resolve and competence of the ANSF(Dalenberg and Jansen 2015).

Figure4: How to solve insecurity problems facing Afghanistan

The officials have underscored the efforts by unity government inacknowledging significant treasure and blood expended to reach thatpoint and commitment by the ANSF to build the legacy. Nevertheless,there is a significant gap remaining within the Afghanistan securityarchitecture that concerns long-term sustainability (Dalenbergand Jansen 2015).

Afghans have greater and equal responsibility for the problems theyare facing currently and they cannot be excused from assuming fullresponsibility for development of ANSF. The many failures facing ANSFare as a result of critical half decade where White House cut backthe requests from U.S. ambassadors and commanders, and essentiallydid not have meaningful strategy for theAfghanistan (Destradi 2014).

The new strategy by U.S. for transferring security responsibilitiesto ANSF is considered not enough in the fight against terrorism.There is high opportunity for the U.S. to lose in Afghanistan unlessit formulates effective strategies in correcting these problems andfund efforts towards correcting problems. Such a strategy can be veryeffective in winning Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Afghan peopleshould realize that they cannot be given enough stability andsecurity to allow opportunity for development, successful governanceand an established civil society that meets the expectations andneeds of Afghan people (Destradi 2014).

The NATO/ISAF and U.S. nations should not act immediately in theirefforts to correct the problems and the shortfall in resources duringmentoring, partnering effort and training. At minimum, ISAF/NATO andU.S. should support and resource plans to accelerate the expansion ofcurrent ANSF. Making a fully resourced start is a recipe for ensuringenough ANSF forces.

Funding

The country will require majorshifts in partnering and training structure as the ANSF forces shiftto areas that are more populated. This helps in moving from combatethos to effective civil-military relations. The president and hisadvisors have dismissed the effectiveness of US in rebuildingAfghanistan. This is only true especially since the U.S. did not helpAfghanistan in achieving the ambitious plans and concepts like AfghanDevelopment Plans. The counterinsurgency should involve an armednation building with ANSF playing a critical role in maintaining therule of law to provide enduring stability and security.

Therefore,the ANSF should be funded since it cannot function effectively unlessU.S. and other nations assist in development of capacity at alllevels.

2.7. Theoretical Framework/Approach

This study aimed at filling in the information gap concerning themilitary power of the Afghan Army. Some critics claim it cannotwithstand the firepower of the insurgents associated with theterrorist groups. Using pragmatic analysis of the most recentAfghanistan data, the study will seek to establish whether theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has adequately trainedthe Afghani armed forces adequately to combat the extremists (Centerfor Army Lessons Learned 141).

Figure5: Conceptual Framework

The analysis of the Afghanistan’s future government will bedetermined through five key considerations:

  1. Comprehend the country’s security status from a stability-focused viewpoint

  2. The primary dedication of the local population and its goals to achieve long-term stability

  3. Establish the critical causes of insecurity in the country as well as possible methods to suppress the threats

  4. Availability of activities or programs that are focused on addressing the known insecurity causes

  5. Finally, the theory will track and asses the outputs of specific activities and their community influence, including changes that are achievable after acquiring wholesome stability (Center for Army Lessons Learned 145).

Once all the entire data necessary to acquire situational awarenessis available, the researcher will use pragmatic techniques toidentify the major sources of insecurity (SOIs) in the country andthe readiness of the Afghani armed forces possibility of suppressingthe problem. The situational awareness and the possibility to fightback the SOIs effectively will determine if the Afghan NationalSecurity Forces can protect the both the citizens and the centralgovernment after the ISAF withdraws from the nation (Center for ArmyLessons Learned 148).

ChapterThree

3.0.Methodology

3.1. Introduction

The methodology section entails the rules and procedures used by theresearcher to base the study and against which various claims ofknowledge can be evaluated. This facilitates review of aspects ofdata collection. This chapter explores the research philosophy,design, approaches, strategy, data collection, sampling methods, dataanalysis, justification for the research methods, reliability andvalidity, ethical consideration and limitation.

3.2. Research Philosophy

A research philosophy is a phenomena based on values, practices,assumptions and concepts. This entails combination of ideas relatedto the function of research and nature of information required, aswell as objectifying the context using subjective processes. Thesubjective reality of the current research was based on historicaland political contexts. In subjective reality, use of interpretiveparadigm is critical in creating a meaning within a given contextwith the intention of identifying the underlying order and patternswithin the political and social world.

In the current study, researcher acted as an interpreter and tried toobtain meaning existing in the political phenomena through analysisof peer reviewed articles, books, and journals to gain anunderstanding of objective manner for a subjective meaning in action.

3.3. Research Design

Research design entails the overall strategy used by the researcherto integrate the different research components in a consistence,coherent and logical manner. This method used pragmatic analysisapproach to determine the probability of Afghanistan stayingpolitically secure.

3.4. Pragmatic Research Approach

The current research adopted a pragmatic approach or mixed method. Apragmatic research approach entails using the method that best suitsthe research problem. Therefore, a pragmatic approach grants theresearcher the freedom to use any technique, procedures or methodsassociated with the research. This approach acknowledges thecontribution and limitations in different research methods and howthey complement each other. The research was therefore at liberty touse peer reviewed articles, books, and journals.

Based on the nature of the topic and limit factor, use ofquantitative research approach through administration ofquestionnaires or pragmatic research through conducting interviewswas quite challenging. The use of pragmatic research approach wasbeneficial as it allows the researcher use different techniquesconcurrently or choose the one that best suites the research.Therefore, in the current research, data and investigatortriangulation were critical where the researcher used variety of datasources and different researchers with information on ISAF, ANSF,NATO and Afghanistan government (Auerswald andSaideman 2014).

3.5. Sampling and Selection

The idea behind any sampling technique tends to vary significantlyand may reflect the questions and purposes of the study. In choosingthe study sample, the research used method of purposive sampling.This sampling method is strategic and necessitates the attempt toestablish good correspondence between sampling and research questions(Bryman 2004). The researcher chose to use secondary researchmaterials. In this case, several sources of data related to theresearch topic were collected. Thereafter, those that were publishedearlier than 2011 were discarded. A total of thirty sources wereselected. This included peer reviewed articles, books, and journals.

3.6. Data Collection

Data collection entails the manner in which data is systematicallycollected during research for analysis. Secondary data collectionmethod was used in the current research. Although case studies werealso used, they were restricted to the Afghan-Soviet War that tookplace in the country between 1979 and 1989. The case study wasrelevant since the conflict back then aimed at establishing apowerful government in Afghanistan that would in turn prevent thecountry from becoming a haven for extremists (Afghanistan: CountryOutlook 2013).

3.6.1. Secondary Data collection

Secondary data collection is the process where the researcher relieson information that has been already gathered and compiled fromeither the distributor or originator of the primary research. Thismethod entails collection information from third parties such asresearch reports, peer reviewed articles, journals and websiteamongst others.

Secondary data is easy to access where the researcher is not requiredto visit libraries or administer questionnaires. By a click on theinternet, the researcher is able to obtain a wide range ofinformation from credible sources. This is convenient and allows forstandardization of all the sources used in research. Also, secondarydata is cheap to acquire hence allowing the researcher accessvaluable information at no or low cost. This is much cheaper thanwhen the researcher carry out the research him/herself. Secondarydata collection facilitates the alignment of the research focus. Inthis case, the researcher can easily realize that the informationbeing sought for already exists. This eliminates the expense and needto carry out a primary research. In most cases, the authors ofsecondary research give details on how the data was collected,limitations and procedures. Therefore, a detailed analysis of similaror same research allows the research decide on the potentialimportance of information collected and the potential difficulties todetermine whether the research is worth carrying out.

Therefore, the current research used secondary techniques in datacollection.

3.7. Data Analysis

The information from the secondary sources was collected, analyzedand verified. In this case, the analysis involved review of vastarray of information. This was majorly guided by the researchobjectives and research questions.

3.8. Justification of the Research3.8.1. Reasons for choosing Secondary Research

Secondary research was used in the current research due to itsflexibility where the researcher is granted an opportunity to usedifferent sources. Based on the nature of the the current study andsensitivity of the topic, conducting interviews or admnistreringquestionnaire to respondents would have been challenging andexpensive. Nevertheless, there are other trusted sources likejournals and peer reviewed articles that provided a more accurate,cheaper and easily accessible data.

3.9. Validity and Reliability of the Research

Eligible data to be used in the research study was collected frompeer-reviewed research information conducted within the last fouryears in Afghanistan. This implied that the data collected was validand reflected a true picture of the current situation in Afghanistan. In addition, the data was obtained from credible authors anddetailed information on the methods used in information collection. This ensured that the collected data was reliable since the authorshave been directly or indirectly involved in welfare of Afghanistanas far as security and fight against extremists groups is concerned.

3.10. Ethical Considerations

Kumar (2005) defines ethics as a discipline that deals with right andwrong behavior within a moral framework established on obligation andduty. In the current research, the research proposal was submittedand ethical approval granted by the supervisor prior to the actualresearch. Bryman (2004) acknowledges that collecting information fromthe other authors without acknowledging them is unethical. In lightof this, the researcher cited all the secondary sources used usingTurabian citation style.

3.11. Limitations of the Research

Although every effort was observed to avoid unnecessary bias, theresults might be biased since some missions conducted by theinternational forces are kept secret. Besides, the extensive damageto infrastructure in the country prevents adequate media coverage ofthe insecurity events taking place in the country. Finally, both theAfghani Army and the ISAF might have withheld crucial data concerningthe damage the insurgents cause to avoid causing security panic tothe civilians (Mazhar, Samee and Naheed 2013, 69). Theinconsistencies in data collection and different literature sourcescould have resulted in inaccurate results concerning the capabilityof the Afghanistan’s Armed Forces to provide security to both theGovernment of National Unity and the civilians (Mazhar, Samee andNaheed 2013, 73).

3.12. Conclusion of Chapter Three

This chapter discussed methodological approach that was undertaken inthe research. The research design, methods for data collection,research approach, reliability of the research and ethicalconsiderations were highlighted.

ChapterFour

4.0. Results and Findings4.1.Introduction

This chapter draws upon the major themes as well as present findingsfrom the subsequent information collected. The key themes emergingfrom collected information were the community perception onextremism, the competency of president in fighting insecurity,effects of presidential elections, problems facing ANSF, TalibanInsurgence and future of Afghanistan government. All the themesappeared to be interconnected. From analysis of secondary and primarydata, it was clear that Afghanistan is in security crisis without thecapacity to defend the civilians from the constantly increasingnumber of extremist groups in the country.

4.2. Sources of Secondary Data Analyzed

The Table below shows the sources of secondary data used. Theresearcher used 30 sources.

Table1: Sources of Secondary Data

Participant

Profile

Peer reviewed articles

There were articles that were written and reviewed by various individuals involved either directly or indirectly with ISAF, ANSF, NATO or Afghanistan government.

Books

Various books containing the information relating to the research topic. The researcher used books from credible authors who have been involved either directly or indirectly with Afghanistan security hence reliable.

Journals

Journals used contained written record of experiences, thoughts and observations relating to Afghanistan security.

4.3. Themes4.3.1. Community perception on extremism

Extremism in Afghanistan is running out of hand and is currently in alevel that is alarming.

Most of the community members have been expressing their unbeliefby the rate at which extremism is spreading. Extremists are not infor a good cause especially because they neither have laws nor aconstitution that govern them. This means that whatever they settheir mind to do will always be based on ideologies, which in mostcases conflict with those from the government (Williams 2014, p. 49)

He described the current extremist situation as a threat to thenation mainly because the extremists appeared to have better networksand contacts with most youths.

Most of Extremists have grassroots contacts and perfectorganizational skills that enable them get more contacts with theyouths, especially those in marginalized areas, and recruit them at ahigher rate than the government can prevent (Williams 2014, p. 45).

Another author cited the weakness of the government in dealing withthe insurgent groups. He expressed fear in the rising number ofnonviolent groups.

The government strategy in fighting the violent and nonviolentgroups remains questionable. Though there are considerable stepstowards fighting the violent groups, it is still unclear on what thegovernment is doing to suppress the nonviolent groups which arealways opposed to the government (Storch 2015, p. 20).

Motwani and Bose (2015) acknowledge that the insurgent groups pose amajor threat not only to Afghanistan but also to the rest of theworld. The two authors highlight the importance of the foreign aid,not as a dictator to Afghan government, but as a savior. They citedinstances where the civilians perceived international forces andforeign aid as a manipulative tactic to get to the government.

4.3.2.Competency of presidency in fighting insecurity

Some authors acknowledge the existence of gap in presidency asregards the war on terror. They argue that though president Ghani hasbeen making efforts in fighting insurgent groups, his leadership isfaced by numerous challenges such as inadequate funds and poordomestic governance.

Ghani has tried in reaching out to neighbors such as Pakistan toengage them in negotiations on how they can help in curbing thecurrent insecurity situation in the country. Nevertheless, I feelthat such a step is commendable but it will take quite some timebefore the negotiations bear fruits (Jedingerand Mader 2015, p. 91)

Javaid and Farhat (2013) argue that thepresidency is not actively engaging the international communitytowards the fight against terrorism.

this goes back to the incident when ISAF came to assistAfghanistan fight insecurity and accidently killed some civilians.During this incident, the president was outraged and perceived ISAFas selfish and inconsiderate. This means that if there were propercommunication between the president and ISAF, such petty issues couldhave been avoided (Javaid and Farhat2013, p. 310).

It was clear from the authors that the presidency was not doingenough in terms of the fight against terrorism. Though many peerreviewed articles highlight the funding challenges and poorgovernance, it was evident that there is still much that need to bedone like proper organization and communication with theinternational community and their neighbors.

4.3.3. Effects of presidential elections

According to Jedinger and Mader (2015), thefraudulent and highly contested presidential elections played a majorrole in heightening the current security situation. They argue thatthe government would have been stronger if only one party won fairly.They cite issues like confusion and ethnicity in governmentappointments as major recipe that could have culminated to civil war.

The presidential elections were highly fraudulent and the twoprincipals involved were not ready to concede defeat. Even after theintervention of United State and formation of unity government, theirleadership had suffered from poor governance where the appointmentswere characterized by nepotism and ethnicity. Each principal foughtto have his people in government (Jedingerand Mader 2015. p. 97).

They noted that the appointments in government have beencharacterized by shift in power from the traditional leadership thatwas there previously.

The former jihadi elites were replaced by western technocrats.This has done away with the traditional religious authorities andliberal reformers. This shift in power reduced the trust of Afghanstowards presidency and governance. Lack of trust to the governmentprovided a safe haven for the Taliban and other nonviolent groupswhich were against the government (Jedingerand Mader 2015. p. 100).

Generally, the authors believe that if the reforms will continuebeing delayed even after 2015, then the country may not be strongenough to fight against insecurity especially because of the poorgovernment structures and challenges in leadership (Dalenbergand Jansen 2015,

Destradi 2014, Grassi 2014).

Dalenberg and Jansen (2015) highlightthe plight resulting after the two principals failed to honor theagreement with the United States on the retention of ISAF after 2014.They had postponed it to 2015 and now that 2015 is ending, they havespilled it over to 2016. This has made the US limit the funding afactor that has negatively affected the government in its fightagainst insecurity.

4.3.4. Problems facing ANSF

Felbab-Brown (2015) agrees that ANSF isfacing many problems like poor planning and logistics as well asinadequate enablers like medical evacuation and deficiencies inreconnaissance and intelligence.

The forces in Afghanistan are suffering from poor planningespecially because the government did not have appropriatestructures. As such, some people were trained for weeks after whichthey were assigned to guard the provinces which were under constantthreats from Taliban. Due to lack of experience, many of themsuffered serious injuries while others were killed (Felbab-Brown2015, p. 410)

He also highlighted the plight of ANSF due to lack of funding.

Due to inadequate funding, most operations do not have medicalevacuation personnel or even means for close air lifting in case ofinjury. This has resulted in many officers suffering fromunsustainable casualties. Also, lack of enough funding has seen manypeople in ANSF lacking the means to fight and sustain themselvesduring winter and this has provided an advantage to Taliban who havebeen targeting the troops during winter when most sections arecovered by snow and ice (Felbab-Brown2015, p. 412).

It was clear from the authors that ANSF is challenged bothfinancially and in terms of experience. It is therefore evident atthis point that ANSF cannot fight Taliban on their own.

4.3.5. Taliban Insurgence

The Taliban militia have been trying so much to overrun some of theprovinces in Afghanistan. Their main intention is to destabilize thegovernment and gain control over the country.

According to Laub (2014), the move to overrun some provinces havenegative implications on Afghan forces since they have to call forreinforcement. This implies that some areas have to be eitherdeprived of forces or given the newly trained forces to be in charge.Such militia do not have the capacity to resist Taliban insurgence.

Also, Lee (2015) argues that insecurity is also caused by somepolitical, business and ethnic groups with varying ideologies.Taliban takes advantage of the fractious and discriminatory situationto recruit youths from these warring areas as well as carry outinsurgents.

Taliban has always taken advantage of any gap in securitysituation in the provinces to carry out insurgents as well as recruityouths from these areas (Lee 2015, p. 37).

Lynch (2015) says that many insurgent groups are not mostly concernedwith the ISAF and other international communities. He points out thatthe main objective of these groups is to render the government inAfghanistan and ANSF powerless.

4.3.6. Future of Afghanistan government

As noted by most authors, the future of Afghanistan government isdependent on International community, religious leaders and civilsocieties and the government itself.

Masoud (2015) argue that the international community will be criticalin the fight against insecurity. Nevertheless, the internationalcommunity should enjoy some protection from the government to ensurethat their activities are protected and they are not considered tomanipulate the government as it was previously.

Shahrani (2015) describes the need for civil societies, donors andreligious leaders to work with the government in creating awarenessamongst the population on the need to protect their country and notto engage in any activities that will destabilize the country. Heargues that those groups are well versed with the community needs andcan easily interact with the people and sensitize them. Therefore,there is need for the government to protect the population beforethey get recruited by the insurgent groups.

Mazhar, Samee and Naheed (2015)recommend the need for Afghan government to realize that theextremist groups pose a major threat to the stability of the countryand should come up with the strategy that will help counter suchgroups both in short term and long term.

ChapterFive

5.0. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

From the finding of the research, it is clear that as the U.S. hastried winding down the military participation in theircounterinsurgency in Afghanistan after struggling with the Talibanand Al-Qaeda for over a decade, the future of Afghanistan remainsprecarious at best. Taliban and affiliated insurgent groups likeHezb-e-Islami and Haqqani Network are still deeply entrenched.Nevertheless, it is clear from the analysis of the articles that thenew international jihadi affiliates like ISIS have been trying toestablish themselves in Afghanistan. This has caused an atmosphere ofuncertainty from different authors regarding the ongoing dilemma inpolitical, economic and security transitions that have pervaded thecountry since 2013 (Destradi 2014).

As noted by Jedinger and Mader (2015), the formation of UnityGovernment in 2014 after the highly contested elections appeared tobe a culmination of uncertainty in the region. The newly formedgovernment faced fundamental structural problems which were clearlyvisible after eight months in office. The deep and broad politicalproblems exacerbated during elections had not started to heal.Looming on horizon was the political crisis that was generated byparliamentary elections especially the Loya Jirga&nbspthatwanted to reform the constitution by 2016 to alter the basisarrangement of power and codify the structure of unity government(Fazli, Johnson and Cooke 2015).

The articles analysed to determine the main drivers of radicalizationand extremist activities revealed that extremism is currently goingoutside the Sharia laws. Extremists are considered as rebellious andrejecting the political order of 2001(Grassi 2014). The authorsbelieved that extremism was a major problem to the security of thenation. Nevertheless, some authors like Lynch (2015) argued thatthere were civilians who believed that extremists were justified intheir cause. He says that only 10 percent of the 60 percent whoclaim to be against extremism are ready to fight for Afghanistan.This implied that the will to act aggressively is lacking. Therepresentatives of nongovernmental organisation and civil societyactivists have been out-manoeuvred by nonviolent Islamist groups,violent extremist groups and mullahs whose organizational skills andgrassroots contacts were better particularly amongst the youths(Fazli, Johnson and Cooke 2015).

Lyall, Blair and Imai (2014) consider amove to publicly question violent extremism as very risky especiallyin volatile areas such as Nangarhar and Herat provinces. Theinability to mobilize the constituencies effectively is attributed tolack of indigenous and clear anti-extremist narrative. The increasedcorruption and poor governance in the country hinder any advancementtowards pro-democracy narrative. Also, the invoking anti-extremistrhetoric targeted to groups like Taliban without it been mistaken asanti-Afghan or anti-Islamic inhibits efforts towards fighting theextremist groups (Felbab-Brown 2015).

Laub (2014) and Motwani andBose (2015) believe that the Afghanistan government has not beeneffective in their CVE efforts and many people have been questioningthe appropriateness of the strategy used by the government in dealingwith both the violent Taliban group and nonviolent and outspokenlyanti-government groups like Jamiat-e Islah and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Thesegroups have a huge youth base and have been openly criticizing thegovernment though they have been nonviolent in their actions (Fazli,Johnson and Cooke 2015).

According to the survey carried out by Smith (2014) on ‘prospectsfor Afghanistan as ISAF withdrawal approaches’, mostcivilians were unsure whether the non-violent groups may consequentlybecome violent. The groups have been facing numerous problems bothfrom the government and from violent groups such as Taliban. Giventhe historical records of violent political oppositions, Felbab-Brown(2015) considers nonviolent groups to be among the first to makeviolent push as well as expel the government while other believedthat fear of anarchy in case the state collapses and rise of someextremist groups like ISIS would compel the nonviolent groups tofiercely oppose the government. Either way, main concern for most ofauthors was the lack of transparency and confusion that existed aboutthe nonviolent groups, their goals, support networks and motives(Felbab-Brown 2015, p. 101).

Despite the occasional predatory behaviour and continued weakness ofthe government, the perception of the many civilians on violentextremist groups was overwhelmingly negative (Waldman 2015). In hisinterview with Lt. General David Deptula USAF(Ret.), Williams (2015) says that extremists are cannot justify theirinsurgent activities. Another issue that are evident from the reviewof journals is that the government is having weak voice and henceconstantly exposing Afghanistan under the influence of foreigners. Itwas noted that many extremists used religion to advance theirself-interests. Lang (2015) argues that based on the fact thatTaliban do not have a constitution or government then this impliesthat their punishments and insurgencies are majorly based onsubjective tastes instead of religion law or constitutional laws.Also, the nonviolent groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir and Mullah werequestioned by many authors as their agendas and funding seemed tohave been sourced externally (Grassi 2014, Khalilzad2013, Lee 2015). This had little to do with Islamiccredentials of the groups or actors but was based mostly on perceiveddeficit in being an Afghan. Indeed, both the forces opposing thegovernment and government itself were perceived by many authors aslegitimate if they were able to prove their how they can make Afghanbe a better place (Fazli, Johnson and Cooke 2015).

Meanwhile, after the exit of ISAF, the fighting season between Afghansecurity and Taliban has been at its bloodiest since 2001. There havebeen significant instances of insecurity in the country with civiliandeaths shooting up while the security forces are taking fatal andpotentially unsustainable casualties. It is clear that the forces inAfghanistan have numerous deficiencies. Nevertheless, as noted fromthe Gross (2014), the Taliban has also been suffering from manychallenges on its capacity to hold as many territories in Afghanistanas possible in future.

President Ghani competence in fighting against terrorism is highlyfaced by numerous challenges such as structural dependence oninternational funding and domestic governance mire staking hispresidency on negotiations with Taliban. To facilitate negotiations,Ghani reached out to Pakistan in a politically and daring costlygambit. Though some initial initiatives towards commencing thenegotiations are underway, there has been limited pay off and Ghani’spolitical space continues to shrink. Also, any fruitful negotiationsmay be real after several years to come (Javaid and Farhat 2013).

Until 2014 summer, the support of Afghan government from U.S. hasbeen underspecified and limited. The Obama’s admin had inheritedwar from Bush Administration at a time when the security inAfghanistan was not good at all. The Haqqani and Taliban influenceshad increased and the governance in Afghan was deterioratingprogressively. Afghan was undergoing one of the toughest securitychallenges since 2001 alongside rampant corruption. During thepresidential campaigns in 2008, Obama had emphasized that thecritical but unfinished ‘war of necessity’ (Javaid and Farhat2013).

Despite the rhetoric involved in elections, the Obama’sadministration after taking over power had been suffering fromsimilar dilemma experienced by Bush administration in Afghanistan. AlQaeda was the major terrorism targets to United States and theadministration argued that what happening on ground mattered only toa limited scale and that they needed to combat counterterrorismoperations on Al-Qaeda and its allies from air so as to reduce thepresence of their troops in Afghanistan (Jedinger and Mader 2015).

However, the president of Afghanistan was outraged by the accidentkilling of innocent civilians by ISAF. This made the president andpopulation doubt that the presence of ISAF in Afghanistan would beinstrumental in stabilizing the country. Most of Afghans believedthat the interest of US government was to prosecute the new greatgame against China and Russia. As a result, the US opted to withdrawfrom Afghanistan by the end of 2016. Other Jihadist groups such asISIS took advantage of the US withdrawal plans and extensively spreadacross Pakistan and Middle East which compelled US to bomb the ISIStargets in Iraq as well as mobilize international coalition againstre-invigorated insurgency (Khalilzad 2014).

Many books and peer reviewed journals indicate that the highlyfraudulent and contested presidential elections played a major rolein igniting prolonged and intense political crisis. The crisisbrought the country to the peak of ethnic and political violence andwas in the verge of provoking a military coup that would haveeventually culminated to civil war. US had during this time orderedan overdrive with the aim of averting such disastrous outcomes. Therecount of votes confirmed extensive fraud by principal contendersand neither was ready to accept defeat. This compelled the US embassycome in and proposed formation of unity government covering bareminimum deal and sketching out mere outlines and details. Thestructural constitutional and electoral reforms were to be worked outlater. This is still unresolved up to today (Khalilzad 2014).

The two principals, Ghani and Abdullah signed the agreement by UnitedStates on how to keep the ISAF in Afghanistan after 2014.Nevertheless, the NUG never met the agreement by 2014 and this wasspilled over to 2016 though NATO and US have been providing limitedtraining and advice support to the Afghan forces. This has compelledthe forces in Afghan to continue standing on their own but theresponsibility has been assigned to ANSF. The ISAF handed over toANSF a stalemated war where they had already cleared and reduced theterritory for insurgent forces. In spring of 2014, there was a majorachievement in Afghanistan when ANSF managed to prevent a majormilitary disruption from the Taliban (Lang 2015).

By the summer of 2014, the ANSF was facing numerous problemsincluding poor planning and logistics, inadequate specialty enablerslike medical evacuation and deficiencies in reconnaissance andintelligence. This inhibited the full manifestation of sustainmentfunctions making them remain unaddressed. ANSF suffered fromunsustainable and extensive casualties. For instance, in 2014 alone,over 20,000 ANSF support personnel and soldiers lost their lives dueto injuries and deaths in desertions, discharges and combat(Khalilzad 2014).

Financial constraints also present another major problem. In thiscase, ANSF fully depended on funding from US and other foreignfunding. The fact that the forces failed to engage in a coup afterthe fraudulent presidential elections was commendable. The ANSFrefused to be fractures along ethnic lines though ethnic andpatronage factionalisation and fragmentation remain a realpossibility amongst them which is feared to be disastrous if iterupts (Smith 2014).

By the end of 2014, almost all areas in Afghanistan were covered byice and snow. During this period, Taliban heightened their attacksand their campaigns were aggressive during this period. The onset of2015 was characterised by difficulties in fighting the Taliban as thearmy was compelled to endure the significantly worsening securitysituation in the country (Shahrani 2015). The army is currentlysuffering from deficiencies and problems in funds to finance theirlogistics, special support functions like medical evacuation andintelligence resource. Lack of close-air support in Afghanistan posesa major threat and can greatly boost insurgency (Masoud 2015).

Figure6: Insider threats in Afghanistan

As such, it is agreeable that the ANSF cannot fight Taliban withoutany assistance. Therefore, US government agreed in March 2015 not toreduce their military presence in Afghanistan throughout 2015. Thisimplied that ten thousand US personnel will remain in Afghanistan. ByJune 2015, reports indicated that US forces in Afghanistan wereengaging in direct offensive operations against both the Al Qaeda andTaliban (Laub 2014). This implied that they went beyond advisory andtraining and beyond the force protection. They provided air supportincluding drones which was critically needed by Afghan army but itwas lacking which prematurely cut down the active support and realimprovements in their security tactics (Masoud 2015).

It is critical to note that Whitehouse has been against such supportand any re-expansion of the US mission in Afghanistan. Despitepresident Ghani raining the alarm on extension of ISIS activities inAfghanistan, the US has vowed to completely withdrawal all the troopscome 2016. Only 1000 forces will be left to provide protection to theUS Embassy. On the other hand, NATO has announced plans to bring in asmall mission led by civilian military in Afghanistan after 2016. Thecommander of international coalition forces in Afghanistan GeneralJohn Campbell, the NATO mission will be based in Kabul and would beunder the NATO military contingent. This will include the forces fromUS protecting the embassy. The NATO forces at the base mayoccasionally be used to boost the intelligence service and air forcein Afghanistan (Lyall, Blair and Imai 2014).

While NATO and US government havebeen debating on their role in Afghanistan after 2016, 2015 isappearing as the bloodiest year in history where many soldiers andcivilians have lost their lives. In April 2015, the reports by UnitedNations Assistance mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) showed that thefirst three months in 2015 saw an increase of 8 percent in civiliancasualties when compared to same period in 2014(Lyall, Blairand Imai 2014). Over 10,000civilians died or were injured in 2014due to the on-going militaryconflict. This was the highest number recorded in history since theUN started keeping records. This was 22 percent higher than it was in2013.

Figure7: Civilian Deaths and injuries in Afghanistan: source UN 2015

May 2015 was characterised by significant deterioration of securityand heavy clashes were reported in more than 10 provinces inAfghanistan. The minister for interior in Afghanistan, Noor-ul-HaqUlumi, had portrayed a graver increase in insecurity with 11provinces being the most vulnerable to security threats. Ulumi hasbeen blaming Pakistan for the increased insecurity arguing that themilitary operations in Afghanistan in Northern border pushed theforeign fighters to Afghanistan and strengthened the insurgencies byHaqqani and Taliban (Mazhar, Samee and Naheed2014).

Ironically, US have over the years tried to cajole, pressure andpersuade Pakistani intelligence and military services to help incracking down the safe havens for the anti-Pakistani militants andAfghan Taliban as they believe such a move can be critical inimproving the security situation in Afghanistan. Though the Pakistangovernment was slow to act, the terrorist attack in summer of 2014compelled the military in Pakistan to conduct a comprehensiveoperation to eliminate all the insurgent groups. This played a majorrole in fracturing the groups but some of the Afghan Taliban Networkslipped into Afghanistan (Mazhar, Samee andNaheed 2014).

A significant deterioration in security is expected in 2015 in someof the major battlegrounds. Such attacks have affected even someareas in Afghanistan that were safe such as Ghor and Faryab(Williams 2015). The research shows that not all insecuritycases are as a result of Taliban military efforts. Rather, some areashave experienced insecurity as a result of rivaling businessmen,politicians, tribes and power brokers amongst others. At times,insecurity has been upped with the intention of securing thegovernment appointments. Such violent military and politicalcontestation has allowed Taliban to take advantage of the conflictsand gain a crucial foothold and strengthen its position (Lee2015).

Influx of the foreign fighters who fly the black flags of ISIS arealso partly to be blamed for the escalating violence in Kunduz andBadakhshan where Taliban has overrun the Afghan police and militaryoutposts and have been taking hostages the security forces inAfghanistan. The Taliban militia have been trying to overrun theprovincial capital forcing the afghan military to sendreinforcements. Such reinforcement means a decrease in number ofAfghan forces in Kunduz provincial leadership. This compelled therecruitment of about 1,000 forces with the hope that this would helpthem halt the progress of Taliban in the province. The training tookfew weeks and this was risky and considered as tried-and-failedtactic. Such militia cannot resist any insurgence from Talibanwithout strong back-up from ISAF, ANSF and United States (Lynch,2015).

Kunduz is among the major provinces in Afghanistan that experiencesextensive militia engagements. The area is frequently beholden to thehighly divisive powerbrokers that engage in predation of the localcommunities and majorly abuse the rival ethnic tribes and groups. Theprovince experiences discriminatory and fractious politics and thisact as a soft target for the Taliban who have also managed to createsupport groups to carry out insurgents (Lynch,2015).

The southern Afghanistan, Helmand, has experienced issues ofinsecurity. The section is intensely contested by the Talibanmilitia. The president has tried to make the Afghan forces his ownbut this has been antagonizing segment which has been pulling forcesfrom Helmand battlefield and keeping them on the eastern border. Sucha move by Ghani is considered costly and risky both in terms ofeffects on the strength in battlefield and morale of the Taliban aswell as his networks that is critical in his support in Afghanistan.Such a prioritization fuels resentment of reconstituted NorthernAlliance of his political rivals and alienates his support for thePashtuns. Ghani can be considered to have little muscle when comparedto most of his rivals despite his intention of building closerrelationship with his networks (Motwani andBose 2015).

Future of Afghanistan GovernmentInternational community

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) activitiesshould be well strategized by the international community. Anyattempts without proper planning can potentially exacerbate thetrends towards violent extremism whether through exposure toreprisals or backlash against CVE efforts. There is great need totake upon practical measures to push back against any violentextremists. The international community will be critical in CVEefforts in Afghanistan though their role may be limited. This isbecause the government in Afghanistan is perceived as a puppet forforeign interests. Nevertheless, the CVE efforts should not beconsidered as being imposed by outside groups to avoid entrenchingthe ‘puppet’ critique of Afghanistan state(Auerswald and Saideman 2014).

From the current situation, it is evident thatAfghan government will depend greatly on foreign aid in its CVEefforts. This implies that, although not inherently expensive, theCVE efforts in Afghanistan will have to be funded internationally.The foreign funding of initiatives towards CVE poses a dilemmaparticularly when the foreign interference is resented. The Afghanshould hold a major role in the program design and implementation to ensure that international groups are not exposed to outsiders,especially to extremist groups (Storch2015).

Apart from funding the CVE initiatives,international community may be instrumental in strengthening thestructure of the state. The performance and legitimacy of Afghanstate is crucial in CVE to enable the international community promoteissues such as anticorruption and other efforts meant to enhancelegitimacy. As long as the Afghan government will rely oninternational funding, benchmarks for such funding should be rigorousand achievable. Penalties for not meeting the benchmarks should bereal (Auerswald and Saideman 2014).

Recommendation for Afghan Civil Society, Donors and Religious Leaders

It will be unrealistic to develop a single CVEstrategy for Afghan since the conditions vary considerably acrossvarious areas in Afghanistan. Grievance messages are mostlycontext-specific and this implies that success will requireidentification of intermediaries who are ready to reach out to thepopulations that are most vulnerable to extremist recruitment andamenable engagement (Waldman 2015).Therefore, detailed CVE programs should only be developed on eitherregional or provincial basis. Some practical recommendations include:

  • Provision of alternative activities and meeting spaces such as sports, education and culture to attract youths since they are the most vulnerable to recruitment into extremist groups. This may also include faith-based places where youths easily congregate and socialize. This will especially important among the marginalized youths who are always hungry to socialize with their peers.

  • Messaging materials should be offered to help Afghans focus on shared values like unity and peace in Islam. The messages and information should be tailored in a way that targets beneficiaries without being overly political. This is mainly because Afghan legal system has been criticized on being sharia-based.

  • The nonviolent Islamist groups must be engaged constructively with respect to their constant critiques for the Afghan state to express the need for them to participate in formulating the state policy and taking part in elections. The debates should moderate the religious scholars with difficult credentials in order to impugn and counter antigovernment rhetoric of nonviolent extremists.

  • The Islamist groups in Afghanistan should collaborate with the government in formulating programs that counter the ideologies of the violent extremist groups. The programs should be designed in a way that condemns violence and should ensure that various segments of the population to empower them on how to counter messages form overly liberal groups.

  • Religious leaders and Mullahs should work as partners in CVE. The religious leaders unwilling to associate with the government may play a key role in discouraging radicalization.

  • Support should be accorded to progressive political parties and youth associations. For instance, the Kabul-centric groups have become famous in recent years.

Recommendation for the Government

The Afghan government must first realize thatextremist groups pose a major threat to the country’s stability andshould therefore devise a holistic and long-term strategy to countersuch groups. The government should engage in programs that targetsthe general public and extremist elements as well. This will becritical in reforming and improving the delivery of services as wellas reduce corruption. Lack of committed state reforms may renderother key components of the CVE unachievable and eventually lead todisillusionment to those who are ready to fight for the Afghan state.

The government should improve its legitimacy onIslamic grounds by working with civilians on messaging as well asprovide civil education that emphasize on constitution and law inAfghan as being grounded on Islam. Anecdotally, very small proportionof Afghans is aware of the Islamic foundations of the state. Aspecific focus should involve legal education and outreach in rule oflaw as a CVE mechanism and eliminate any suspicion of state.

The creation of awareness must begin first byengaging the religious leaders who are considered as the mostprominent. The government should provide them with the information itrequires disseminated as well as engage them in a dialogue on thelegal system and state. Successful leaders will be critical infacilitating meeting and spreading the message further. Also, theleaders may be instrumental in making arrangements for the mostisolated religious leaders to attend seminars and meetings to meetthe wider civil society and government officials. The engagement bythe government of youths and population which is most vulnerable toextremism should be direct and systematic. Youths should beextensively involved in improving and developing outreach messages tothe wider community.

It is imperative if the state stops actingalone and involve the wider civil society. Nevertheless, working withyouths and religious leaders requires careful identification oftrusted and credible individuals. Such individuals can be potentiallyreached for outreach and dialogue after which they can be consideredas partners in the fight against extremism.

References

Afghanistan: Country Outlook 2013.New York: The Economist Intelligence Unit.http://search.proquest.com/docview/1465064666?accountid=8289.

Auerswald, D. P., &amp Saideman, S. M. NATOin Afghanistan: fighting together, fighting alone.Princeton University Press, 2014

Bryman, A. SocialResearch Methods. (2ndEd.). Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2004.

Center for Army Lessons Learned, Afghanistanprovincial reconstruction team handbook: District stability framework(Create Space Independent Publishing Platform, 2011), 2015: 141- 152.

Dalenberg, S., &amp Jansen, M. M. Two Ways ofLeaving: A Comparative Case Study on Exit Strategies of a UN and aNATO Led Mission. In&nbspNetherlandsAnnual Review of Military Studies 2015&nbsp(pp.217-245). TMC Asser Press, 2015.

Destradi, S. Regional Powers and SecurityGovernance: ISAF Withdrawal, Regional Competition, and Domestic Normsin India`s Afghanistan Policy.&nbspAsianPerspective,&nbsp38(4),2014: 565-587.

Destradi, S. Regional Powers and SecurityGovernance: ISAF Withdrawal, Regional Competition, and Domestic Normsin India`s Afghanistan Policy.&nbspAsianPerspective,&nbsp38(4),2014: 565-587.

Embassy, U. S. Six Month Consolidated WarPowers Resolution Report December 2014.

Frazil, R., Johnson, C., &amp Cooke, P.Understanding and Countering Violent Extremism in Afghanistan, 2015.

Felbab-Brown, Vanda. Blood and Hope inAfghanistan: A June 2015 update. BrookingsMay 26.http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/05/26-isis-taliban-afghanistan-felbabbrown.(Accessed October 3, 2015).

GAO report on security force assistance. 2013.Connections: The Quarterly Journal12, no. 2: 103-124,http://search.proquest.com/docview/1443263659?accountid=8289.(Accessed September 21, 2015).

Grassi, Daniele. 2014. Afghanistan’suncertain future: The new unity government is a diplomaticachievement, but its future looks decidedly shaky. TheDiplomat, September 28.http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/afghanistans-uncertain-future/. (Accessed October 3, 2015).

Gross, A. A.&nbspAfghanNational Security Forces (ANSF) Logistics Management SystemSupport&nbsp(No. CAA-2012225).Center for army analysis fort BELVOIR VA, 2014.

Javaid, Umbreen and Farhat Nasreen. Liquidationof American Forces from Afghanistan: Its impacts on the region. SouthAsian Studies Vol 28, No. 2:307-315, 2013

Jedinger, A., &amp Mader, M. Predispositions,Mission-Specific Beliefs, and Public Support for Military Missions:The Case of the German ISAF Mission in Afghanistan.&nbspInternationalJournal of Public Opinion Research,27(1), 2015: 90-110.

Khalilzad, Zalmay. 2014. A new start forAfghanistan: 3 massive challenges that will decide its future. Thenational Interest, October 20.http://nationalinterest.org/feature/new-start-afghanistan-5-massive-challenges-will-decide-its-11501?page=2.(Accessed October 3, 2015).

Kumar, R. ResearchMethodology – A Step by Step Guide for Beginners.(2ndEd.). London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2005.

Lang, J. Afghanistan: the view fromRussia.&nbspEuropean Union Institutefor Security Studies. Retrieved from European Union Institute forSecurity Studies: http://www. Iss. Europa.eu/fr/publications/detail-gage/article/afghanistan-the-view-from-russia.,2015.

Laub, Z. TheTaliban in Afghanistan.&nbspCouncilon Foreign Relations.2014.

Lee, J. A Case for Pragmatic, MinimalistApproaches to the Afghanistan War.&nbspJournalArticle| Aug,&nbsp25(4),2015: 37.

Lyall, J., Blair, G., &amp Imai, K. Afghancivilians are much more tolerant of harm from the Taliban than theyare from ISAF.&nbspLSE AmericanPolitics and Policy, 2014.

Lynch III, T. F. After ISIS: Fully ReappraisingUS Policy in Afghanistan.&nbspTheWashington Quarterly,&nbsp38(2),2015: 119-144.

Masoud, Fahim. Afghanistan’s Future:Interview with Amrullah Saleh. InternationalPolicy Digest, 26 August.http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2015/08/26/afghanistan-s-future-interview-with-amrullah-saleh/(Accessed October 3, 2015).

Mazhar, Muhammad Saleem, Samee Ozair Khan, andNaheed S. Goraya. 2013. Post 2014-afghanistan. SouthAsian Studies 28, No 1, pp. 67-84,http://search.proquest.com/docview/1369670723?accountid=8289.(Accessed September 21, 2015).

Motwani, N., &amp Bose, S. Afghanistan:‘spoilers’ in the regional security context.&nbspAustralianJournal of International Affairs,&nbsp69(3),2015: 266-284.

Shahrani, N. M. The Impact of the 2014 US-NATOWithdrawal on the Internal Politics of Afghanistan: Karzai-styleThugocracy or Taliban Theocracy? AsianSurvey,&nbsp55(2),2015: 273-298.

Smith, B. Prospects for Afghanistan as ISAFwithdrawal approaches. EconomicIndicators,&nbsp4,14.

Storch, Thomas. 2015. Afghanistan’sprecarious future. World AffairsJournal, April 23.http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/thomas-storch/afghanistan%E2%80%99s-precarious-future(Accessed October 3, 2015).

Waldman, Matt. “System Failure: TheUnderlying Causes of US Policy-Making Errors in Afghanistan.” International Affairs, Vol.89, No. 4 (July 2013), pp. 825-843,https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/ia/archive/view/193087(accessed September 21, 2015).

Williams, B. G. The Drone Campaign against AlQaeda and ISIS: Interview with Lt. General David Deptula USAF(Ret.).&nbspPerspectives onTerrorism,&nbsp9(3),2015.

Appendix

Table2: Military and Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan

Source: Ministry of Defense First published:18 February 2014 Last updated: 15 January 2015

Year

&nbsp

Casualties (excluding Natural Causes)

&nbsp

Field Hospital Admissions

&nbsp

Aeromed Evacuations

&nbsp

Total

Very Seriously Injured or Wounded

Seriously Injured or Wounded

&nbsp

Total

Wounded in Action

Disease or Non Battle Injury

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

Total

&nbsp

616

&nbsp

306

&nbsp

310

&nbsp

&nbsp

7,443

&nbsp

2,188

&nbsp

5,255

&nbsp

&nbsp

7,400

&nbsp

2001

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

2002

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

2003

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

2004

&nbsp

6

&nbsp

3

&nbsp

3

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

2005

&nbsp

2

&nbsp

2

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

&nbsp

2006

&nbsp

31

&nbsp

18

&nbsp

13

&nbsp

&nbsp

240

&nbsp

85

&nbsp

155

&nbsp

&nbsp

262

&nbsp

2007

&nbsp

63

&nbsp

23

&nbsp

40

&nbsp

&nbsp

832

&nbsp

234

&nbsp

598

&nbsp

&nbsp

572

&nbsp

2008

&nbsp

65

&nbsp

27

&nbsp

38

&nbsp

&nbsp

1,008

&nbsp

235

&nbsp

773

&nbsp

&nbsp

800

&nbsp

2009

&nbsp

157

&nbsp

82

&nbsp

75

&nbsp

&nbsp

1,229

&nbsp

508

&nbsp

721

&nbsp

&nbsp

1,313

&nbsp

2010

&nbsp

154

&nbsp

80

&nbsp

74

&nbsp

&nbsp

1,262

&nbsp

518

&nbsp

744

&nbsp

&nbsp

1,225

&nbsp

2011

&nbsp

69

&nbsp

34

&nbsp

35

&nbsp

&nbsp

921

&nbsp

274

&nbsp

647

&nbsp

&nbsp

1,147

&nbsp

2012

&nbsp

44

&nbsp

23

&nbsp

21

&nbsp

&nbsp

952

&nbsp

222

&nbsp

730

&nbsp

&nbsp

1,121

&nbsp

2013

&nbsp

17

&nbsp

10

&nbsp

7

&nbsp

&nbsp

742

&nbsp

95

&nbsp

647

&nbsp

&nbsp

613

&nbsp

2014

&nbsp

6

&nbsp

3

&nbsp

3

&nbsp

&nbsp

257

&nbsp

17

&nbsp

240

&nbsp

&nbsp

347

&nbsp

Nov-13

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

51

&nbsp

4

&nbsp

47

&nbsp

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

Dec-13

&nbsp

2

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

2

&nbsp

&nbsp

31

&nbsp

4

&nbsp

27

&nbsp

&nbsp

24

&nbsp

Jan-14

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

37

&nbsp

2

&nbsp

35

&nbsp

&nbsp

35

&nbsp

Feb-14

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

&nbsp

27

&nbsp

Mar-14

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

&nbsp

29

&nbsp

4

&nbsp

25

&nbsp

&nbsp

29

&nbsp

Apr-14

&nbsp

2

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

&nbsp

26

&nbsp

May-14

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

&nbsp

40

&nbsp

Jun-14

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

&nbsp

25

&nbsp

2

&nbsp

23

&nbsp

&nbsp

28

&nbsp

Jul-14

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

23

&nbsp

4

&nbsp

19

&nbsp

&nbsp

54

&nbsp

Aug-14

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

23

&nbsp

4

&nbsp

19

&nbsp

&nbsp

43

&nbsp

Sep-14

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

14

&nbsp

1

&nbsp

13

&nbsp

&nbsp

33

&nbsp

Oct-14

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

3

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

3

&nbsp

&nbsp

16

&nbsp

Nov-14

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

10

&nbsp

Dec-14

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

&nbsp

4

&nbsp

0

&nbsp

4

&nbsp

&nbsp

6

&nbsp

Source: Initial NOTICAS

Source: UK and Coalition Medical Facilities

Source: AECC

1. Data starts 7 October 2001.

2. The latest three months of data are provisional and subject to change.

3. The VSI and SI data includes personnel with an initial NOTICAS listing of VSI or SI who were alive at the time of discharge from their first hospital episode in the UK.

4. The VSI and SI injury data includes records classified as `Other Causes`. This classification is used when there is insufficient information to attribute a casualty to injury or natural cause.

5. Civilians are not included in the figures previous to 1 January 2006.

6. The personnel listed as VSI or SI may also appear in the UK field hospital admissions and aeromed evacuations data.

7. The admissions data contain UK personnel admitted to any field hospital, whether operated by UK or Coalition Medical Facilities.

8. The disease or non-battle injury figures are non-battle injuries only until 27 October 2006 disease is included from 28 October to be consistent with Op TELIC reporting.

9. Field Hospital Admissions data starts 1 March 2006.

10. Data from the Role 3 UK Medical Facility at Camp Bastion ceased on 22 September 2014 due to its closure. From 22 September 2014 field hospital admissions data is sourced from Coalition Medical Facilities only.

Close Menu